July 14, 2006

I anticipated that I’d object to the anticipated Washington Post editorial about the recent escalation of violence in the Middle East. However The Mideast Erupts showed a measure of understanding that wasn’t apparent in some other editorials yesterday.

WHEN ISRAEL withdrew its troops from southern Lebanon in 2000 after more than two decades of occupation, it also issued a warning: Any cross-border provocations by Hezbollah, the militant Shiite group, would elicit a severe military response. So there can be no surprise at the violent reaction to Hezbollah’s ambush of an Israeli patrol Wednesday, in which three soldiers were killed and two others taken captive by the guerrillas. And there can be no doubt that Iran and Syria, Hezbollah’s chief sponsors, bear responsibility for what has instantly become the most far-reaching, lethal and dangerous eruption of cross-border fighting in the Middle East in recent years. Europeans and others in the international community are already criticizing as excessive Israel’s swift military response. Conspicuously they have said comparatively little about the volleys of dozens of rockets Hezbollah rained down on northern Israel yesterday. In fact, given the all-too-familiar patterns of violence and retribution in the Middle East, the Israeli attacks are entirely predictable, and precisely what Hezbollah and its patrons must have expected and even wanted.

Then the editorial gets lost

But for Israel, the pressing question must be whether its reprisals will be effective in achieving the desired results — retrieving the soldiers taken hostage and reasserting Israeli deterrence in the north.

Actually, as will be discussed later this is an awfully unambitious agenda for Israel. Israel’s goal should be the destruction or, at least, crippling of Hezbollah (and Hamas.) Israel’s attacks are not (and cannot be) simply geared toward “reasserting … deterrence.” Later the editorial brings up some other (mistaken) conventional wisdom that is equally suspect.

But even if Hezbollah is punished politically at home for its wild irresponsibility, the underlying problem — its benefactors in Iran and Syria — remains. That’s where American and allied diplomacy and influence should be focused. Tehran should be called to account in the U.N. Security Council not only for its program to enrich uranium but also for its support of Hezbollah. Damascus, which hosts Hezbollah and Hamas, should also come under renewed international pressure, including sanctions. In all the diplomacy, the false lure of “evenhandedness” must not be allowed to obscure the fact that Hezbollah and its backers have instigated the current fighting and should be held responsible for the consequences.

I cannot quibble with the last two sentences, however the rest of the paragraph is disappointing. Diplomacy? Sanctions? These are courses of action that should have been taken years ago. Nearly six years ago to be precise. In October 2000, after Israel withdrew from Lebanon and its withdrawal was certified by the UN, Hezbollah violated the international border and kidnapped and killed three Israel soldiers. It was a time that the world could have shown how much it believed in diplomacy. A terrorist organization violated an international border that a member state of the UN had retreated behind. But not a word. It turned out that the UN had, in fact, protected Hezbollah and lied about it. And there was not a word of protest or calls for the removal of Kofi Annan or Terje Roed-Larsen for their roles as accessories to the crime. (A search of the Washington Post’s archives showed that the Post didn’t devote a single editorial bemoaning this violation of international law. It did, however, feature an editorial “Mideast escalation” (April 19, 2001) that criticized the new government of PM Sharon for “…its preclusion of all other, nonmilitary options.” Of course if it had been honest it would have noted that diplomacy hadn’t rescued those soldiers.) Daled Amos takes a more jaundiced view of the editorial. With good reason. But if there are a couple of paragraphs that recommend the Post’s editorial, there is nothing to recommend op-ed columnists David Ignatius’s Behind the crisis, a push toward war After making clear that he doesn’t want Israel to fight back too much he lays out his principles of success in turning back Middle Eastern terror

The first is that in countering aggression, international solidarity and legitimacy matter. In responding to the Lebanon crisis, the United States should work closely with its allies at the Group of Eight summit and the United Nations. Iran and its proxies would like nothing more than to isolate America and Israel. They would like nothing less than a strong, international coalition of opposition.

“[I]nternational solidarity and legitimacy matter,” except, as noted above, when Israel is involved. Remember the UN sided with a terror organization over a member state, even though, if the UN truly wished to end Israel’s “occupation” it would have acted to show that the retreat from Lebanon gained Israel international protection.

A second point — obvious from Gaza to Beirut to Baghdad — is that the power of non-state actors is magnified when there is no strong central government. That may sound like a truism, but responding wisely can require some creative diplomacy. The way to blunt Hamas is to build a strong Palestinian Authority that delivers benefits for the Palestinian people. The way to curb Hezbollah is to build up the Lebanese government and army. One way to boost the Lebanese government (and deflate Hezbollah) would be to negotiate the return of the Israeli-occupied territory known as Shebaa Farms. That chance is lost for now, but the Bush administration should find other ways to enhance Siniora’s authority.

Good grief! There was a strong PA. And what did it do? It encouraged terror against Israel and, at best, ignored groups committing terrorism against Israel; at worst, actively aided the terrorism. And here he goes even farther than the UN. When the UN certified Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon it did not address Shebaa Farms that it regards as Syrian territory. The only reason that Hezbollah claims Shebaa Farms for Lebanon is because Syria (and, of course, Hezbollah) need a pretext to justify its continued terror against Israel. And Ignatius is saying: legitimize the claims of the terrorists.

A final obvious lesson is that in an open, interconnected world, public opinion matters. This is a tricky battlefield for an unpopular America and Israel, but not an impossible one. To fight the Long War, America and Israel have to get out of the devil suit in global public opinion. For a generation, America maintained a role as honest broker between Israel and the Arabs. The Bush administration should work hard to refurbish that role.

But it’s difficult to be the good guy when institutions that should be supporting freedom are denigrating it. As a member of the fourth estate, Mr. Ignatius should so some responsibility and question the terrorists not shill for them. The larger problem is why Israel still faces terror from Lebanon and Gaza when the grievances presumably driving terrorism from those areas have already been addressed. (I see that I’ve addressed this in the past.) Charles Krauthammer addresses that question head on in Why They fight. The answer is

Because occupation was a mere excuse to persuade gullible and historically ignorant Westerners to support the Arab cause against Israel. The issue is, and has always been, Israel’s existence. That is what is at stake.

3 sentences address the problem precisely. All the rest is commentary, but darn good commentary. Read the whole thing. Finally if the grievance is Israel’s existence, no amount of diplomacy is going to help. (In fact “diplomacy” as practiced in the Middle East, more often than not, serves to legitimize the illegitimate designs of Israel’s enemies.) Michael Oren outlines Necessary Steps for Israel

Efforts by the United States, the United Nations and the European Union to dissuade Iran and Syria from activating their terrorist agents have consistently proved ineffective. Therefore Israel has no realistic option but to convince these states that the price of promoting aggression is prohibitive. If Israeli soldiers and civilians are the targets of Iranian- and Syrian-backed terror, then the Iranian and Syrian militaries must become targets for Israel. By eliminating the terrorist leaderships in Gaza and southern Lebanon and deterring Syria and Iran from prodding their proxies to war, Israel can restore a reasonable level of security to its citizens.

No doubt the editors of the Washington Post and pundits like David Ignatius would view Israeli actions that involve killing the heads of Hamas and Hezbolalh and striking at Syria and Iran as overly harsh. But by now it’s way past the point of talk. What’s at stake is not just peace and stability, but Israel’s existence too. Technorati tags: Charles Krauthammer,David Ignatius,Michael Oren,Washington Post, Israel.

Crossposted on Israpundit and Soccer Dad.