Israel has elected to shoot into the belly of the beast.
By Ted Belman
David Horovitz in JPOST wrote Fighting Hamas in the shadow of 2006’s mistakes. In it he identifies three groups of targets that I have extracted.
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[..] In contrast to 2006, Israel’s leaders are not talking about destroying the enemy as an aim of this confrontation. But the ostensible aims of the “Cast Lead” operation amount to requiring Hamas not to behave like Hamas - not to fire into Israel or target Israeli civilians or soldiers; not to prepare for such attacks; not to store or smuggle in the material for such attacks. And that is not going to be achieved quickly.
Of course, Israel may choose to settle for less. But for now, it is adamant that long-term calm is the goal, no matter how prolonged or bitter the conflict that ultimately yields it.
For months, Israel has been refining its intelligence information on the key physical locations that are crucial to the rule of Hamas in the terror state that the Gaza Strip has become since the Islamist group seized power there in June 2007.
And rather than seeking to target the nimblest offshoots of that terrorist rule - the Kassam crews that set themselves up in residential Gaza neighborhoods, fire into Israeli residential areas and then quickly melt away - Israel has elected to shoot into the belly of the beast.
The first wave of Saturday’s air strikes targeted Hamas training bases, military facilities, weapons stores and other locations used by the Hamas security apparatus; Hamas has some 15,000 armed men in the Strip, defense officials estimate.
In the second wave, targets included underground rocket-launch sites - where Hamas had readied rockets for remote-control fire. Other such sites, as well as weapons stores and factories, located near schools or on the lower floors of apartment blocks, were not touched. At this stage.
Horovitz goes on to worry about the international fallout. He is not alone in that.
I fail to see why we should worry about it. Israel should render it ineffective by ignoring it. Giving in to it only encourages it.
As IAF ran out of Hamas targets on Shabbat, less than 20 airstrikes took place on Sunday morning. The most important thing in a lopsided military campaign is to maintain initiative, suppress the enemy’s coordination by ongoing offensive. In small Gaza, such a standard tactics cannot be carried out because destruction reaches the saturation point very quickly.
As the militants recover from the first shock and get used to the fact of Israeli invasion, they will re-group. It is unclear yet whether IAF destroyed any significant weapons stores: there were no major or prolonged blasts, thus Hamas weapons caches seem to survive the first attack.
Ehud Barak, a political traitor and failed strategist but a brilliant tactician, executed an excellent deceit cover for Israeli attack on Gaza, and caught Hamas off-guard. Egyptians collaborated with Israel and informed Hamas of the continued calm just hours before - they knew it - Israeli attack.
Apparently, Barak was planning the Gaza invasion for the last six months. The level of information-gathering and preparation is incomparable to that in 2006. Still, it remains to be seen whether the invasion can defeat and, more importantly, demoralize Hamas into submitting to Fatah. A few knocked out Israeli tanks or downed helicopters would boost the guerrillas’ morality through the roof.
A wave of suicide bombings by Hamas is unlikely as IDF, police, and citizens are on the high alert. After ceasefire ensues, Hamas would not grossly violate it with suicide bombings.
For the first time, Ashdod is hit by Hamas rockets.
Both Hamas and IDF officials went underground, each in their own bunkers. The reason for IDF/IAF generals to open the underground bunkers in Tel Aviv Kirya HQs is unclear: apparently, the generals are simply playing the war game.
Only 15 civilians are reported dead in Gaza, only 7% of the total toll - an incredible accuracy which came at staggering cost. The operation, which involves more than 100 aircraft, expensive smart bombs and guided rocket, cost Israel close to $0.5 billion in the first day only, vastly exceeding Hamas all-time expenses.
Short of a diplomatic statement, Russia doesn’t provide any support for Hamas which it recognizes as the legitimate Palestinian government.
The Israeli operation depends on Hamas accepting a “live and let live” approach where Israel and Gazans remain hostile but don’t attack each other. According to the Jewish logic, Hamas cannot put up with massive devastation and would end the hostilities. This is so far the case: Mashaal who rejected ceasefire a week ago, now announced his commitment to it. But the policy might not hold in the long term: Israeli retaliation will look less assured, some Gazan militants welcome the war regardless of costs, and the attacks from Gaza resume.
Depopulation of Gaza, political solution with Hamas, or long-term low-level cross-border violence are the alternatives.
Comment by yamit82 — December 28, 2008 @ 4:00 am
Backing off of the offensive would be a terrible mistake.
Comment by Ed D — December 28, 2008 @ 4:38 pm
Kill them all and screw waiting for Obama Christ.
Comment by Michael Sunstar — December 29, 2008 @ 12:38 am