January 1, 2009

By Israel Harel

Many people have been receiving over the Internet a link where Yitzhak Rabin is heard sarcastically attacking those who “fear peace” and who threaten that letting Yasser Arafat’s forces into Gaza would lead to Katyushas on Ashkelon. About six months ago, when Hamas was on the ropes and begging for a cease-fire, many people warned that if Israel responded and picked Hamas up off the ropes, the rockets it would fire after it recovered would reach Ashdod and Be’er Sheva.

But Defense Minister Ehud Barak, in a very strange decision, decided to allow Hamas to regroup, increase its capabilities, manufacture and smuggle in more advanced arms, and upgrade from a gang of terrorists to a Hezbollah-like military organization. Now the people of the Negev - and especially the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip - are paying the price of the defense minister’s weakness and failed leadership, and the whole government bears collective responsibility.

The declared goal of Operation Cast Lead (”the creation of a new security reality”) is minimalist and reveals Israel’s unwillingness to fight for a long-term resolution that will create a comprehensive new reality, not only a new security reality.

What is worse, the way the battle is being waged after the impressive air strikes raises concerns that the operation’s leaders do not intend to achieve even its modest aims, among other reasons because Israel once again blinked first.

The blinking did not begin on Tuesday with Barak’s announcement that Israel was considering a “humanitarian” 48-hour cease-fire. It began when the first air strikes were not immediately accompanied by a ground operation. Israel showed, as in Lebanon, that it does not want to reach a strategic resolution and does not have the will, determination or self-confidence to lead a military operation beyond reprisal and punitive action.

This is a major and painful operation, but despite its ambitious intentions it is not a military action that will end the eight-year nightmare of the people of the Negev.

The more days go by with the main component aerial bombardment, which, like in Lebanon, cannot stop the rockets, the public begins to feel (our leaders’ arguments show this) that the operation is losing momentum. A sense is growing that something has been missed, especially in the Negev communities.

The national mood, which rallied last Saturday, is beginning to sag, and disappointment is beginning to seep in. The pubic does not want to make do with a situation in which a sovereign country with significant military capabilities - certainly vis-a-vis Hamas - once again signals that it is willing to stop a battle at its height, before a real response to the problem that led the Israel Defense Forces into the fight in the first place.

Had it not been for the 80 rockets fired at the Negev a week ago Wednesday - which aroused public anger that the government and defense minister cannot ignore, especially before elections - it is doubtful the operation would have begun. That’s the way it was after the suicide bomber at the Passover seder in Netanya in 2002. After that major attack and more than 130 casualties in the suicide bombings of the previous month, prime minister Ariel Sharon could no longer claim that “restraint is strength.” However, then, when Operation Defensive Shield was finally launched, the goal was to root out terror.

Then, too, a loud media campaign opposed entering cities; then, too, military reporters and commentators, among them retired generals, frightened us that there would be masses of casualties; then, too, they said terror could not be beaten by military means. But the result even after eight years speaks for itself.

At the end of the operation Israel withdrew from big cities like Nablus, Ramallah and Jenin. But the destruction of terror infrastructure and the psychological shock the terror groups experienced made it possible for the IDF to sharply reduce its number of attacks to this day. This is mainly because the army can, if need be, enter the cities almost unhindered to stop anyone planning a suicide attack or making rockets intended for the Tel Aviv region’s population centers.

If there will still be a ground operation in Gaza, it must not be hesitant like in Lebanon. It must be conducted as Defensive Shield was, minus the command misstep in Jenin. And if the political and military leadership does not have the courage to risk soldiers to decide the campaign and attain its goals, then it is better not to risk them.

If the concealed goal is not resolution but another cease-fire, then it is a pity to use ground forces because the enemy will revive once again and smuggle in rockets, which this time will be able to hit Dimona, and perhaps even Tel Aviv. And once again the air force will be sent in. And again, after every red line is crossed, there will be an amazing air strike. And what then? And until when?