[...] The Israelis demanded strict parity, and, since Abbas wasn't fulfilling his obligations, Sharon avoided fulfilling his. In a narrow sense, then, Israel's behavior was fair. But it wasn't wise. Missing was any understanding that Abbas--who even Israeli hard-liners concede genuinely abhors terrorism--was valuable in and of himself, that helping him supplant Arafat was more valuable to Israel's security than demanding lockstep reciprocity for every Israeli concession. One Abbas ally said, "I told Sharon, [Defense Minister Shaul] Mofaz, [Defense Ministry adviser Amos] Gilad, that this government might not last more than three months. I said it was in their hands. They thought I was speaking poetry or trying to bribe them."

If Israel had done more to help Abbas, would it ultimately have made a difference, especially after Hamas's August 19 bus bombing in Jerusalem? (Palestinian officials say that, after the attack, Dahlan finally agrees to arrest large numbers of Hamas militants; Israelis say he dithered, leaving them no alternative but to act themselves.) Who knows? But, even if the answer is no, Israel wouldn't have lost anything by trying. It would merely have found itself in the same hideous place it is today.The day Abbas resigned, we met three young members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, all reformers, far closer to Abbas and jailed Tanzim leader Marwan Barghouti than to Arafat. "We are the losers with his resignation," said one. "We are in shock. It's hard to talk because we are so upset." I wish I had heard at least one Israeli official say the same.