However, until and even after Camp David, Friedman acted as if only Israel had had offered him enough he might have changed. (Barak's offer at Camp David wasn't enough for Friedman; it was an "opening offer.")
However here's where he starts to lose traction:

Will Arab leaders, like Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who put forth a peace plan, be ready to really help the Palestinians make the tough decisions by giving them Arab cover? Or will we simply have another generation of expressive politics by Arab leaders, who love the Palestinian cause but not the Palestinian people?

As I've noted elsewhere, Abdullah's plan was always a fraud and Friedman must have known that. As Abdullah went around trying to get support for his plan he went to (his nephew) Bashar Assad of Syrian. Assad insisted that Israel was still occupying Lebanon despite the UN certification of Israel's withdrawal a few months after it happened. If Friedman were honest about the "peace plan" he would have immediately declared it a fraud. But he didn't. He continued to tout Crown Prince Abdullah's list of specific demands and nebulous promises as a "peace plan."

Ariel Sharon seems to have already started to learn some of the lessons of Arafat's life. Mr. Sharon was asked recently what made him change his mind, and risk his own life and political career, to undertake a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza after so many years opposing such a move. His answer: There were things he could see "from here" that he couldn't see "from there."

There are many situations where I'd trust Prime Minister Sharon more than Thomas. This is not one of them. PM Sharon is not risking his life to withdraw from Gaza.

"Sharon has started to give up his popularity among his own constituency, because he realizes that the welfare of the Israeli people, as a whole, requires decisions that are unpopular but unavoidable," said the Israeli political theorist Yaron Ezrahi. But Sharon cannot stop just with Gaza. He's got a lot more popularity to give up with his old constituency if we're going to see a deal on the West Bank.

But we won't see a deal. Certainly no time soon. Part of the problem are people like Thomas who approve every demand of the "moderate" Palestinians. All of Judea and Samaria? Sure that's reasonable. Well, actually it isn't. As long as the Palestinians know that anything less than 100% of Judea and Samaria will be dismissed as "Bantustans" by Israel's critics, well they'll hold out for that and claim the moral high ground.

Finally, what about President Bush? When it comes to the Arab-Israel question, he's had a little bit of Arafat disease himself. He's given some of the best speeches of any president on the Arab-Israel issue and delivered the most pathetic diplomacy I have ever seen.

I remind him of what Aluf Benn has written (link no longer available):

The Bush administration, which appears indifferent, has been far more involved than any previous administrations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and has courageously presented the two sides with practical objectives and demands, instead of making do with the statement that the U.S. cannot want a peace settlement more than the parties themselves - a statement that has justified past failures. Under Bush, Sharon has adopted a policy that is the reverse of what he believes in, and has accepted severe limitations on his own freedom of action. Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat, who tried to lead the previous administration by the nose, has tried to continue his policy of lies with Bush and has been punished: He is under house arrest and is being blackballed diplomatically.

Instead of looking at things with any sort of in depth insight, Thomas looks at things superficially. A lack of progress is not necessarily the President's fault. The President can't make the Palestinians want peace more than he does. Until that changes pushing forward is a mistake; perhaps even a dangerous mistake.

This divide reflects the paralyzing split in his administration between those who understand that America will never win the war of ideas in the Middle East without working seriously on the most emotional issue in Arab political life - the Palestine question - and those, like the vice president and secretary of defense, who think the whole issue is overrated. The first group are right, the second are wrong. The president needs to choose.

Nope, the first group is wrong.
Here's Daniel Pipes in "Israel's Moment of Truth" from February 2000 - When Ehud Barak was Prime Minister:

Historically, Arab "rejectionism"--that is, the refusal to accept the permanent existence of a sovereign Jewish state in its historic homeland --has been based on one or another local variant (pan-Arab, pan-Syrian, Palestinian, or the like) of nationalism, a European import into the Middle East. It has suffered from two disabilities: limited reach and factionalism. But as, recent years, the rejection of Israel has taken on a less secular and more Islamic complexion, it has gained a deeper resonance among ordinary Arabs, with Israel's existence now cast as an affront to God's will, and has also benefited operationally from a somewhat greater degree of unity (Islamists are surprisingly good at working together). The net effect has been not to moderate but, on the contrary, to solidify and to sharpen Arab antagonism to Israel--vocal rejectionist elements now include pious Muslims and Islamists, Arab nationalists, despots, and intellectuals--and to give fresh impetus to the age-old dream of destroying it.

The point cannot be made often or strongly enough that, in their great majority, Arabic speakers do continue to repudiate the idea of peace with Israel. Despite having lost six rounds of war, they seem nothing loath to try again. In one of the most recent in-depth surveys of Arab opinion, conducted by the political scientist Hilal Khashan of the American University of Beirut, sixteen hundred respondents, divided equally among Jordanians, Lebanese, Palestinians, and Syrians, stated by a ratio of 69 to 28 percent that they personally did not want peace with Israel. By 79 to 18 percent, they rejected the idea of doing business with Israelis even after a total peace. By 80 to 19 percent, they rejected learning about Israel. By 87 to 13 percent, they supported attacks by Islamic groups against Israel.

This is the view of Israel that dominates political debate in the Arab world and that is conveyed to the public in every arena from scholarly discourse to the popular media to nursery-school jingles. True, some Arabs think otherwise. The late King Hussein of Jordan spoke eloquently of the need to put aside the conflict with Israel and to get on with things; his son and successor appears to be of like mind. Some Arab army officers would undoubtedly prefer not to confront Israel's military forces any time soon. Kuwaitis and Lebanese Christians, sobered by occupation, now mostly wish to leave Israel alone. And there are business leaders who believe, as one Arab banker succinctly put it, that "the whole purpose of peace is business." But these elements, overall, represent but a minority of the Arab population, and have not shifted the underlying hostility.

If Thomas were right, Arab opinion should have been more accepting of Israel in 2000.

Yasir Arafat preferred to die, beloved by all his people, in a Paris military hospital - rather than sacrifice his popularity and maybe his life so that the majority of his people could live and die at home. Will Ariel Sharon, George Bush and the Arab and Palestinian leaders now follow his model and play to the crowds, or play to history?

Yasser died in Paris not because he preferred anything. Until the end of his life he never had to pay a price for his irredentism. He could take the maximum position and not worry that he'd be marginalized. Too many for too long exonerated him because of his cause.
Crossposted on Israpundit and Soccer Dad.