Depending on how you count, the number of errors in logic and fact, which the foregoing statement contains, ranges between ten and twenty. "Palestinian state"? "democratic Palestinian state"? "Just solution"? "Occupation"? "THE central problem"? "Palestinian land"? "Palestinian people"? And so on.

Many authors have dealt with these points, including, in particular, Douglas Feith in "A mandate for Israel", Benjamin Netanyahu in "A
Durable Peace", and Mitchell Bard in "Myths and facts".

But not enough has been done, particularly by the government of Israel. Those who speak for Israel have allowed the myths to spread and penetrate, and have even adopted the enemy's terminology themselves. Where one should use consistently "Yesha Arabs", the government of Israel talks about "Palestinians". It starts with language, and before you know it, you have surrendered entirely.

If all this sounds sloganeering and trite, I call upon Daniel Jonah Goldhagen to convey the message as to just how serious the situation and the potential consequences are. The following passages are based on his 1997 tome, "Hitler's Willing Executioners" (see complete citation at article's end); page numbers cited below refer to that work.

In his exposition of the background to the attempted extermination of the Jewish people by the Nazis, Goldhagen [p. 80] employs the concept of "discourse", which he describes as "a discussion structured by a stable framework with widely accepted reference points, images, and explicit elaborations". In more detail, Goldhagen describes the elements of "discourse" thus:

Look at our own society. It is virtually an unquestioned norm that democracy (however understood) is a good thing, is the desirable form for the organization of politics. It is so unquestioned, and also uncontested in current political parlance and practice... [P. 32]

Many axiomatic features of a society's conversation are not readily detectable, even to the discerning ear. They include the vast majority of culturally shared cognitive models. Cognitive models--beliefs, viewpoints, and values, which may or may not be explicitly articulated--nevertheless serve to structure every society's conversation. Cognitive models, which "typically consist of a small number of conceptual objects and their relations to each other, .... inform people's understanding of all aspects of their lives and the world, as well as their practices. From understanding emotions...to constructing a map of the social and political landscape, to making choices about public institutions and politics... people, in both their understanding and their actions, are guided by their culturally shared cognitive models, of which they are often but dimly or not at all aware... [P. 33]

When a conversation is monolithic or close to monolithic on certain points--and this includes the unstated, underlying cognitive models--then a society's members automatically incorporate its features into the organization of their minds, into the fundamental axioms that they use (consciously or unconsciously) in perceiving, understanding, analyzing, and responding to all social phenomena. [P. 33-34]

A society's conversation defines and forms much of an individual's understanding of the world. When beliefs and images are uncontested or are even just dominant within a given society, individuals typically come to accept them as self-evident truths. Just as people today accept that the earth revolves around the sun, and once accepted that the sun revolves around the earth, so too have many people accepted culturally ubiquitous images of Jews. The capacity of an individual to diverge from prevailing cognitive models is still smaller because cognitive models are among the individual's building blocks of understanding, and are incorporated into the structures of his mind as naturally as the grammar of his language. An individual learns the cognitive models of his culture, like grammar, surely and effortlessly. They each--unless, in the case of the cultural cognitive models, the individual at some point works to re-configure them--guide the understanding and production of forms that depend on them, contributing to the generation, in the case of grammar, of sentences and meaning, and in the case of cognitive models, of perceptions of the social world and articulated beliefs about it. [P. 46]

Within a society, the most important bearers of the general conversation are its institutions, including crucially the family. It is in institutions generally, and particularly in those that are prominent in socializing children and adolescents, that the belief systems and cognitive models, including those about Jews, are imparted to individuals. Without institutional support of some kind, it is extraordinarily difficult for individuals to adopt notions contrary to those that prevail in society, or to maintain them in the face of widespread, let alone near unanimous, social, symbolic, and linguistic disapproval. [P. 46]

Goldhagen provides an example of how accepting the anti-Semitic terminology, specifically, the term Judenfrage ("the Jewish problem") served the anti-Semitic propaganda as a whole. Note the similarity in principle between the allusion to Judenfrage and the terminology, so beloved by Tony Blair, concerning "the centrality of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict". In the next citation, read "Israel" in lieu of "German Jews", "European" in lieu of "German", and Goldhagen's text about Germany just before the Nazi ascent to power may apply exactly to the contemporaneous discourse in Eurabia about Israel:

The German discourse in some sense had as its foundation the extremely widespread, virtually axiomatic notion that a 'Judenfrage,' a "Jewish Problem," existed. The term 'Judenfrage' presupposed and inhered within it a set of interrelated notions... Because of the Jews' presence, a serious problem existed in Germany. Responsibility for the problem lay with the Jews, not the Germans. As a consequence of these "facts," some fundamental change in the nature of Jews or in their position in Germany was necessary and urgent. Everyone who accepted the existence of a "Jewish Problem" - even those who were not passionately hostile to the Jews - subscribed to these notions, for they were constitutive of the concept's cognitive model. Every time the word Judenfrage (or any word or phrase associated with it) was uttered, heard, or read, those partaking in the conversation activated the cognitive model necessary to understand it. [P. 80-81]

This axiomatic belief in the existence of the "Jewish Problem," more or less promised an axiomatic belief in the need to "eliminate" Jewishness from Germany as the "problem's" only "solution." [P. 81]

The toll of these decades of verbal, literary, institutionally organized, and political antisemitism was wearing down even those who, true to Enlightenment principles, had resisted the demonization of the Jews. The eliminationist mind-set was so prevalent that the inveterate antisemite and founder of the Pan-German League, Friedrich Lange, could with verity declaim the universal belief in the "Jewish Problem," rightly pointing out that the means to the "solution," and not the existence of the "problem" itself, was the only remaining subject of doubt and disagreement. [P.81]

Conclusion. I posit that by adopting the enemy terminology, from "Palestine", through "roadmap" to "occupation", we are essentially accepting the enemy's "discourse", which illegitimizes Israel and ultimately the Jewish people. The background is being prepared for the EUrabians to actually take an active part in the destruction of Israel, just as the background was prepared for so many "ordinary Germans" to partake in the destruction of the Jewish people during WW II. And after Israel, the EUrabians will most assuredly gang up once again on the Jewish people outside of Israel. If all this sounds far fetched, then may I state that my track record has proven time and again to be overly optimistic.

Reference:

Daniel Jonah Goldhagen. Hitler's Willing Executioners. New York: Random House, 1997.