The problem is that the article is an exercise in fantasy:

As Mr. Arafat lay dying, the principal leaders agreed to jettison their longstanding refusal to cooperate with any government that was involved with the 1993 Oslo peace accords. Most significant, the top Hamas leader on the West Bank, Sheik Hassan Yussef, declared that the group should consider an indefinite "hudna" - or pause in armed conflict - if Israel were to withdraw to its pre-1967 borders, approve a right of return for Palestinian refugees, release long-term prisoners and raze the wall being built in the West Bank.

Of course these are terms that are unacceptable to Israel (and should be unacceptable to everyone else in the world). And Atran even acknowledges that:

While these conditions are of course unacceptable to Israel, the fact that a hudna was offered at all was remarkable. Mr. Yussef, who was released in November after more than two years in an Israeli prison, insisted that he was simply reiterating positions stated in the past by Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the Hamas founder who was assassinated by Israel in March. But this may be semantic sleight-of-hand: Mr. Yussef told me last week that "hudna" clearly meant that both sides in the lifelong conflict could live in safety and peace as long as it lasts, and that it could even be extended indefinitely. "We can dream about all Palestine being Muslim - like some Israelis dream of a Greater Israel that includes all our lands - but it is not practical," he said.

So even as Atran admits that the Yussef's conditions would be unacceptable to Israel he acts as if Hamas has agreed to lay down its arms! It's also remarkable that Atran doesn't mention that past hudnas have been times for Hamas to recover and re-arm; he just takes Yussef's word that Yussef no longer believes in "Greater Palestine" because it's not "practical!"
It's also disturbing that he attributes a hankering for peace to Sheikh Yassin. Remarkably after Sheikh Yassin and Dr Rantisi were killed Hamas run terror dropped precipitously. Why does Atran simply take Yussef's word that Yassin really wanted an indefinite hudna?
Of course as is common with these profiles of unusual peacemakers in the Arab world there is someone against him:

Of course, Mr. Yussef faces opposition from within. Mahmoud Zahar, a senior Hamas official in Gaza, dismissed the overture, saying that there would be "no talk about a hudna now" and that his group's "strategy is to liberate all of Palestine."

Mr Atran does a nice trick. He creates an illusion. He takes a statement by a member of Hamas who professes his moderation and turns it into an offer, even though the condition is roughly the equivalent of "when Hell freezes over. Then he finds someone who outwardly more extreme than his subject and he has created an instant moderate. It's a neat trick. But it shouldn't be taken seriously.
Jackson Diehl at the Washington Post surprisingly does better. In "Sidestepping Palestinian Democracy" he makes a number of valid points. But like Atran's article, Diehl has his moderate, Mahmoud Abbas and his extremist, Marwan Barghouti. At least the United States and Israel consider Abbas a moderate.
Still Diehl writes:

The problem will come when and if Abbas and Sharon ever sit down to talk about the two-state solution Bush says he wants to achieve in the next four years. As he withdrew last week, Barghouti delivered a poison pill: a list of 18 demands on the Palestinian leadership. Most would kill any talks before they start, such as the stipulations that Israel withdraw from all Palestinian territories before negotiations begin, that there be no partial or temporary agreements, and that "the principle of armed resistance" be preserved.

Think about the significance of Barghouti's position. In 1993 the PLO was legitimized because it purported to give up terror. Barghouti eschews even that fig leaf. Diehl though doesn't show any signs of grasping the significance of Barghouti's position.
Instead he laments that Barghouti won't be running:

Probably the new president will press ahead, but he will be weak -- and Barghouti, like the Islamic militants in Hamas, will portray him as unrepresentative of most Palestinians. Israelis will lose something, too. They won't know themselves whether the accommodating Abbas, who already has banished anti-Israeli incitement from Palestinian television and is pushing the militants to declare a cease-fire, represents his people -- or whether they still support the violence of Arafat and Barghouti. One American veteran of Mideast diplomacy counseled the Israelis at that Saban conference to hope for a Barghouti candidacy. "Let's find out," he said, "what's in Palestinian hearts." The truth could have been bitter, but it also could have been galvanizing. Now, we won't know it.

True Israel won't know by virtue of elections where Palestinian society stands. But there are enough polls showing high degrees of support for violence against Israel. Israel really doesn't need Barghouti as a barometer.
What's also unsatisfying about Diehl is that he seems to want to know "what's in Palestinian hearts." Yet he gives no hint as to how he'd process that information.
If there was significant support for Barghouti would it be a sign to Diehl that the Palestinians had not given up their dream of "Greater Palestine" and were thus unworthy of a state. Or would he insist that Israel find the best of a bad lot and negotiate with him regardless of the risks? I suspect the latter. If so, does it really matter what's in Palestinians hearts?
I wish that those who "analyzed" the Middle East would stop imposing their own views onto what's going on and instead focusing on what was actually said, or not said. Is that too much to ask?
Crossposted on Israpundit and Soccer Dad.