"Certainly, gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and the glory of the representative to live in the strictest union ... with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him, their opinions high respect, their business unremitting attention ... But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living.... Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment, and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”
According to this view, the representative is a free agent, and studies indicate that a majority of representatives view their role in these terms.
The other concept, more commonly held by constituents, is that the representative is simply a DELEGATE or AGENT of the voters who elected him. As one American representative put it: “I’m here to represent my district.... This is part of my actual belief as to the function of a congressman.... What is good for the majority of districts is good for the country. What snarls up the system is these so-called statesmen--congressmen who vote for what they think is the country’s interest....Let the senators do that....They’re paid to be statesmen; we aren’t.”
The above conceptions of representation may be related to the Jewish conception of “agency.” Rabbi Moshe Avigor Amiel, the late Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv, writes: “[In Jewish law] one’s representative is legally considered as himself in all matters, even in the monetary sphere, so that any legal act performed by the agent is legally attributed to the principal.” Since appointing an agent does not require a formal contract or witnesses, the relationship between agent and principal is based on trust.
“The agent is under no legal obligation to fulfill his agency. If he abused his agency and, for example, bought the object for which he had been appointed to purchase for himself, the principal has ... no legal redress” (Kiddushin 59a). In spite of this, since we assume that ‘an agent does perform his agency’ (Chulin 12a), we correspondingly assume that the principal has truly made up his mind to agree to any contracting performed by the agent, including all consequences accruing from the acts performed by the agent.
Rabbi Amiel notes that the Jewish principle that ‘an agent does perform his agency’ is based on the assumed ethical character of the Jew, that he will not violate his given word, even if there is nothing forcing him to fulfill it. In contrast, the legal concept in the West is that of the ‘mandate,’ wherein A obligates himself to follow the orders of B, and legal redress is possible in the event of malfeasance.
The Western concept of ‘mandate’ is not based on any assumption regarding the ethical character of those to whom it applies. Conversely, because Jewish law is based on the assumption of the ethical character of the Jew, a Jewish agent is not bound to the orders of the principal, but rather acts as an independent agent, trusted by the principal to fulfill his instructions.
Let us apply the Jewish concept of agency to the representation of citizens in Israel. Impossible! Citizens in Israel vote not for individual candidates with whom they may possibly establish a relationship of trust, but for a party-determined lists of candidates, most of whose names they do not even know. A party cannot be an agent in the Jewish sense of the term. This means that Israel’s parliamentary electoral system violates not only the Jewish but the two Gentile concepts of representation mentioned above!
Of course, Jewish law recognizes that circumstances may prevent an agent from fulfilling the instructions of the principal. Alternatively, the agent may decide that the principal’s best interests require deviation from his instructions, which again indicates that the agent may use independent judgment. It thus appears that a truly Jewish representative synthesizes, in himself, the “delegate” and “trustee” concepts of representation.
Since Israel’s parliamentary electoral system is inconsistent with Jewish law -- indeed, with the electoral laws of almost all countries having democratic elections -- how shall we describe Israel’s present system of “representation,” which allows Knesset members to violate Jewish public opinion with impunity? (Only recall the 1999 national elections, in which 29 Knesset members hopped over to rival parties!)
Political scientists who have studied the behavior, and not merely the public statements of politicians, have developed a third category of how representatives relate to their constituents: the “politico.” The politico is primarily concerned with re-election or personal advancement. This person will vary his views depending on the circumstances and political rewards. Many social scientists think that most members of the American Congress behave as politicos.
The cynicism is overdrawn. An incumbent congressman must compete in a district election. He knows his opponent will expose discrepancies between his, the incumbent’s, words and deeds. This will impose constraints on the incumbent’s legislative behavior: he must be more or less attentive to his voters if he wants to be re-elected.
No such constraints operate on members of Israel’s Knesset—and this is the primary reason why the present government of Ariel Sharon can pursue the policy of ‘disengagement,’ a policy overwhelmingly rejected by the voters in the January 2003 national elections, a policy, moreover, that may be leading Israel to civil war!
Two Types of "Representation”
By Prof. Paul Eidelberg
President, Yamin Israel
{IMHO, we better all get really familiar with these concepts, absent which implemented (or Maschiach, G-d Willing)we have NO chance of reversing the de-Judaizing and subsequent end of the Israeli State (as a Jewish Homeland)- Tiburon}
There are two basic conceptions of how representatives ought to relate to their constituents, neither of which is operative in Israel. The most common is that of a TRUSTEE, which was classically defined by Edmund Burke in 1774. Burke told his constituents after they elected him to the House of Commons:
"Certainly, gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and the glory of the representative to live in the strictest union ... with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have great weight with him, their opinions high respect, their business unremitting attention ... But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men living.... Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment, and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”
According to this view, the representative is a free agent, and studies indicate that a majority of representatives view their role in these terms.
The other concept, more commonly held by constituents, is that the representative is simply a DELEGATE or AGENT of the voters who elected him. As one American representative put it: “I’m here to represent my district.... This is part of my actual belief as to the function of a congressman.... What is good for the majority of districts is good for the country. What snarls up the system is these so-called statesmen--congressmen who vote for what they think is the country’s interest....Let the senators do that....They’re paid to be statesmen; we aren’t.”
The above conceptions of representation may be related to the Jewish conception of “agency.” Rabbi Moshe Avigor Amiel, the late Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv, writes: “[In Jewish law] one’s representative is legally considered as himself in all matters, even in the monetary sphere, so that any legal act performed by the agent is legally attributed to the principal.” Since appointing an agent does not require a formal contract or witnesses, the relationship between agent and principal is based on trust.
“The agent is under no legal obligation to fulfill his agency. If he abused his agency and, for example, bought the object for which he had been appointed to purchase for himself, the principal has ... no legal redress” (Kiddushin 59a). In spite of this, since we assume that ‘an agent does perform his agency’ (Chulin 12a), we correspondingly assume that the principal has truly made up his mind to agree to any contracting performed by the agent, including all consequences accruing from the acts performed by the agent.
Rabbi Amiel notes that the Jewish principle that ‘an agent does perform his agency’ is based on the assumed ethical character of the Jew, that he will not violate his given word, even if there is nothing forcing him to fulfill it. In contrast, the legal concept in the West is that of the ‘mandate,’ wherein A obligates himself to follow the orders of B, and legal redress is possible in the event of malfeasance.
The Western concept of ‘mandate’ is not based on any assumption regarding the ethical character of those to whom it applies. Conversely, because Jewish law is based on the assumption of the ethical character of the Jew, a Jewish agent is not bound to the orders of the principal, but rather acts as an independent agent, trusted by the principal to fulfill his instructions.
Let us apply the Jewish concept of agency to the representation of citizens in Israel. Impossible! Citizens in Israel vote not for individual candidates with whom they may possibly establish a relationship of trust, but for a party-determined lists of candidates, most of whose names they do not even know. A party cannot be an agent in the Jewish sense of the term. This means that Israel’s parliamentary electoral system violates not only the Jewish but the two Gentile concepts of representation mentioned above!
Of course, Jewish law recognizes that circumstances may prevent an agent from fulfilling the instructions of the principal. Alternatively, the agent may decide that the principal’s best interests require deviation from his instructions, which again indicates that the agent may use independent judgment. It thus appears that a truly Jewish representative synthesizes, in himself, the “delegate” and “trustee” concepts of representation.
Since Israel’s parliamentary electoral system is inconsistent with Jewish law -- indeed, with the electoral laws of almost all countries having democratic elections -- how shall we describe Israel’s present system of “representation,” which allows Knesset members to violate Jewish public opinion with impunity? (Only recall the 1999 national elections, in which 29 Knesset members hopped over to rival parties!)
Political scientists who have studied the behavior, and not merely the public statements of politicians, have developed a third category of how representatives relate to their constituents: the “politico.” The politico is primarily concerned with re-election or personal advancement. This person will vary his views depending on the circumstances and political rewards. Many social scientists think that most members of the American Congress behave as politicos.
The cynicism is overdrawn. An incumbent congressman must compete in a district election. He knows his opponent will expose discrepancies between his, the incumbent’s, words and deeds. This will impose constraints on the incumbent’s legislative behavior: he must be more or less attentive to his voters if he wants to be re-elected.
No such constraints operate on members of Israel’s Knesset—and this is the primary reason why the present government of Ariel Sharon can pursue the policy of ‘disengagement,’ a policy overwhelmingly rejected by the voters in the January 2003 national elections, a policy, moreover, that may be leading Israel to civil war!
Posted by Tiburon at January 31, 2005 07:18 AM