The rest of the article suggests that Hoagland believes that this is so much rhetoric, not something to be taken seriously. And that's why the article is flawed. Hoagland doesn't accord irredentist Palestinian beliefs enough. He focuses the mechanics of peace but does little to show that he understands that these mechanics won't work if the premise that both sides want peace is not operative.

The gist of the article is that for the past decade both sides have squandered opportunities and now it's time to start being serious about peace. One of the central paragraphs is:

Such an approach is crucial to reversing the deadly downward spiral that has prevailed since Yitzhak Rabin's assassination in 1995, Binyamin Netanyahu's subsequent evisceration of the Oslo accords, and Yasser Arafat's turn back to obstructionism and terrorism in the summer of 2000. Wasted is no doubt too mild a description for the dreadful decade past.

Netanyahu did nothing of the sort. He insisted on compliance when there was none. Immediately after PM Rabin's assassination Israel speeded up the peace process withdrawing from Jenin, Tulkarm, Bethlehem, Nablus, Ramallah and Kalkilye in quick succession. If anything the assassination sped up the peace process. Then in early 1996 there was the terrible series of terror attacks that killed over 60 people in the space of about ten days.
It wasn't that Arafat turned back to obstructionism in 2000, he didn't accept the responsibilities of peace back in 1996 (or in 1993 for that matter). He allowed Hamas to build its infrastructure and use the areas from which Israel had withdrawn as a base for attacks on Israel.
It's useful to remember that in 1994 when he went to South Africa to celebrated the inauguration of Nelson Mandela, Arafat made his (in)famous speech comparing his peace treaty with the one that Mohammed made. ie that he viewed the treaty as a temporary tactical measure. That's a reason that Abbas's extreme rhetoric and actions should not be dismissed. It isn't just posturing. It's indicative of deeply held beliefs that show that peace is not possible at this time.
Hoagland also inlcudes an interesting detail:

Sharon has indicated that Dov Weisglass, his most trusted aide, will manage initial contacts with an Abbas government, which is likely to include Salam Fayyed, the outgoing, respected finance minister.

Interestingly enough, Condoleezza Rice has quietly developed good working relationships with both Weisglass and Fayyed in her time as President Bush's national security adviser.

I don't know how important this is, given the skepticism I have toward the Palestinian inclination to make peace. However this would seem to refute the notion that President Bush has been disengaged from the peace process. It would suggest that he is engaged, but only with those who are "in gear." Yasser Arafat clearly was not.

Earlier in this post, I had written of my skepticism toward Hoagland's belief that Israel can do business with Abbas on account of Abbas's clear turn toward extremism: "Hoagland doesn't accord irredentist Palestinian beliefs enough. He focuses the mechanics of peace but does little to show that he understands that these mechanics won't work if the premise that both sides want peace is not operative."

I'm not alone. Mark Heller, no right winger, makes a similar point in "Arafat's Baggage:"

Of course, all of this may be nothing more than campaign rhetoric. It is not inconceivable that Abbas, once he takes office and consolidates his authority after parliamentary elections in a few months, will actually try to do what Ariel Sharon did after his re-election as prime minister: throw his slogans onto the trash heap and put all his weight behind a course of action dictated not by ideological nostrums or political convenience, but by what a sober reading of reality demands.

But Abbas's ability to do that will not be evident on Jan. 10, even if he gets 90 percent of the vote rather than a mere 70 percent. And his need to resort to this kind of terminology is not an encouraging indicator of what Palestinian political traffic will bear after the election. These considerations suggest that the army of breathless analysts might do well to hold off the rush to judgment - at least until Jan. 12.

Similarly David Keyes and Dore Gold write in "What If Bush Invited Sharon and Abu Mazen to Camp David? The Prospects for Negotiations in the Post-Arafat Era":

True, Abu Mazen does not wear Arafat's military uniform; he has openly stated that violence does not serve the Palestinian interest; whether he will crack down on armed groups still remains extremely doubtful. Nevertheless, even his most forthcoming statements do not indicate that Abu Mazen has rejected Arafat's political legacy in any way, and that he is more prepared to show flexibility on key issues that separate Israel from the Palestinians.

Moreover, Palestinian leaders such as Abu Ala have yet to overcome their fundamental rejection of Israel's right to maintain its Jewish character. After President Bush referred to Israel as a Jewish state at the 2003 Aqaba summit, Abu Ala said Bush's words "aroused great concern among us. These words should not have been said....These are definitions that will bring the region into turmoil."58 Abu Ala has even voiced interest in "starting new negotiations on Haifa, Jaffa, and Safed."59

Diplomatic initiatives must be preceded by a very careful assessment of the real positions of the parties in order to first ascertain whether bridgeable differences actually exist. Unfortunately, during the Oslo years, the explicit declarations of Palestinian leaders were often ignored and treated as statements for internal consumption alone. Wishful thinking was frequently substituted for hard analysis. This does not mean that in 2005 no "window of opportunity" exists; rather, its actual size must be accurately measured. Indeed, in the present context, a partial cease-fire is more realistic than significant progress on any of the substantive issues raised at Camp David in 2000. What emerges from the foregoing analysis is that a full-blown, final status peace accord between Israel and the Palestinians is probably more remote today than five years ago.

Maybe there is reason for hope of some sort of an accord as Hoagland thinks. But there needs to be allot more from Abbas than is currently apparent for peace to be possible.
Crossposted on Israpundit and Soccer Dad.