Such nobility. (And while we're on the subject of Hamas's non-discrimination policy, it should be noted that they don't discriminate against which Israelis they target either. Real progressives these guys from Hamas.)
Alas, Moore points out, not everyone appreciates Hamas's good works:

Hamas -- with its armed wing, the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades -- is condemned by the United States as a terrorist organization and reviled by Israel as the perpetrator of some of the deadliest suicide bombings of the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis. At the same time, Hamas has won respect among Palestinians by providing education and health programs. Now, when the U.S. and Israeli governments are demanding greater democratization of the Palestinian Authority, voters in the West Bank and Gaza are handing a sizable share of power to a group that many U.S. and Israeli leaders associate more closely with terrorism than with political reform.

Surely though "U.S. and Israeli leaders" could possibly be mistaken. After all:

In Beit Hanoun, and in communities across Gaza and the West Bank, Islamic politicians are earning wide support using old-fashioned tactics valued the world over: fixing potholes, picking up garbage and turning on the lights.

Moore can't get the stars out of her eyes long enough to ask any Israeli official or academic if Hamas's popularity is a good or bad thing. Well, it didn't take me too long, but I did find a dissenter. Granted I didn't have to do much work as the article appeared in my Inbox.
Barry Rubin in "Hamas Victorious" gives short shrift to the idea that Hamas's popularity derives from its constituent services:

Hamas did not win the election because of moderation but through its terrorist attacks, demands for total victory, and opposition to a negotiated peace agreement. While the movement’s social services and reputation for less corruption also helped, no Hamas leader is concluding that the victory requires abandoning extremism. On the contrary, the vote is a mandate for intransigence.

Moreover he looks at the political equation and finds that the gains Hamas made a few weeks ago bode ill for progress in peace talks:

The essential issue is this: If Abu Mazin was too afraid to crack down on terrorists, to moderate Palestinian ideology, or negotiate a compromise peace with Israel when he had all the power, he will now be even more timid. Who cares if Fatah is still in control if it does nothing and changes nothing? If he would not disarm Hamas or use force against terrorists before will he act against such a powerful organization now?
Two examples from before the election. Palestinian terror attacks rose 54 percent between March and April due to Abu Mazin’s passivity. When his forces arrested one Hamas member for firing a rocket at Israel , Hamas simply closed down Gaza with demonstrations for a few hours and threatened government officials’ lives until they released him. Is anyone going to be constrained now from attacking Israel or defying the Palestinian regime?

While many excused Abbas for not acting against Hamas because he didn't have the strength, Rubin argues the opposite: his strength was never greater than just after his election and he allowed the opportunity to act positively to fade away.
What's particularly galling about articles such as Moore's is that they make peace less likely. By portraying Hamas simply as political opposition whose works are good and views could be moderated she gives the terror organization a boost.
(This isn't the first time that the Washington Post has done this sort of terror boosterism. I've noted it before.)
Crossposted on Israpundit and Soccer Dad.