Analysis
During the first visit to the United States by an Egyptian prime minister, Ahmed Nazef met May 18 in Washington with U.S. President George W. Bush. After the meeting, which was as low key as the trip itself, Bush pressed the government of President Hosni Mubarak to move forward with political liberalization (Mubarak did not make the trip to show his displeasure with Bush's democratic push in Egypt). After acknowledging the Mubarak regime's move to allow multiple candidates to compete in the presidential election in for September, Bush called on Mubarak to organize free and fair elections and allow international observers to monitor the process. Meanwhile, responding to a query from the press, a U.S. State Department spokesperson said it remains to be seen whether the process adopted by Cairo constitutes progress in the eyes of the Egyptian people and the world at large.
That Washington is keeping the pressure on Egypt -- a U.S. ally -- shows that Egypt's marginal utility for the United States might soon become negligible. Regime change in Egypt is not something the United States necessarily desires -- or can prevent. It will happen anyway because Mubarak, who is in failing health, cannot remain at the helm for long. But because of the pivotal position of Egypt in the Arab world and in the U.S. foreign policy calculus for the region, the Bush administration is not ready to sit back and allow things to take their "natural course."
Given the limited options on the ground, the Bush administration has adopted a kind of wait-and-see approach, which will make the change more gradual. Though Egypt has been a stable, predictable actor since the late 1970s, serving as the leading mediator in Middle Eastern affairs, all of this is about to change. This regional role has been contingent to a large extent on Mubarak. And since there is no other country that can replace Egypt as the "leader of the Arab world," the coming transition needs to be prudently and patiently thought out.
While the United States has yet to align itself with an alternative political force in Egypt, sorting as it is through the medley of secularists and Islamists who share the support of the Egyptian public, the Bush administration has decided it will not continue to rely on a regime that is about to undergo a metamorphosis at a time when a democratic wave has been set in motion.
Already engaged in pushing democracy in the region, the Bush administration is using this broad policy to ensure a relatively smooth transition in Cairo. More important, the envisioned transition is not meant to be merely cosmetic -- which often has been the case in the past, when the United States did not want to rock the boat of Egypt's entire political system. What Washington seeks to achieve now is a permanent fix in which a democratic system of sorts is put in place that will spare Washington from having to worry about shoring up unpopular regimes.
This is markedly different from the U.S. approach to Syria, where Washington seeks regime change because the incumbent leadership is engaged in behavior that is upsetting U.S. plans for the region. Similarly, in Saudi Arabia it is oil and the threat of militant Islamism that has Washington satisfied with the piecemeal and gradual approach of the Saudis. Moreover, there are no viable alternatives to the Saudi royal family, which is now an institution that has the potential of keeping things in order in Saudi Arabia for some time to come. In Egypt, however, one man has more or less kept affairs in order for 24 years. So the question is: Who or what does the United States have in mind as a replacement for the Mubarak order?
Here is where the lessons of Iraq can come in handy. Without a military invasion and with far less violence, Washington can cobble together a coalition of secularists and Islamists that can take over the government of Egypt. A key difference that can complicate matters is that the Egyptian groups do not enjoy the same amount of leverage within the country that the Iraqi Shia and Kurds do.
Notwithstanding the complexity of the task, the Bush administration has changed its attitude toward Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes, and there is no going back. In Egypt, change is happening regardless of U.S. moves. It remains to be seen whether that change will be in keeping with U.S. expectations.
U.S. and Egypt: Moving Away from Mubarak
Stratfor
SummaryAfter a May 18 meeting with visiting Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Nazef, U.S. President George W. Bush pressed Cairo to move ahead with political reforms. This and other related developments indicate that Washington has effectively decided to move away from the Egyptian regime -- its erstwhile ally -- and try to shape a post-Mubarak Egypt. U.S. plans for change in Egypt, while part of the overall push for democratization in the Middle East, will be both similar to and different from Washington's approach to Iraq, Syria and Iran.
Analysis
During the first visit to the United States by an Egyptian prime minister, Ahmed Nazef met May 18 in Washington with U.S. President George W. Bush. After the meeting, which was as low key as the trip itself, Bush pressed the government of President Hosni Mubarak to move forward with political liberalization (Mubarak did not make the trip to show his displeasure with Bush's democratic push in Egypt). After acknowledging the Mubarak regime's move to allow multiple candidates to compete in the presidential election in for September, Bush called on Mubarak to organize free and fair elections and allow international observers to monitor the process. Meanwhile, responding to a query from the press, a U.S. State Department spokesperson said it remains to be seen whether the process adopted by Cairo constitutes progress in the eyes of the Egyptian people and the world at large.
That Washington is keeping the pressure on Egypt -- a U.S. ally -- shows that Egypt's marginal utility for the United States might soon become negligible. Regime change in Egypt is not something the United States necessarily desires -- or can prevent. It will happen anyway because Mubarak, who is in failing health, cannot remain at the helm for long. But because of the pivotal position of Egypt in the Arab world and in the U.S. foreign policy calculus for the region, the Bush administration is not ready to sit back and allow things to take their "natural course."
Given the limited options on the ground, the Bush administration has adopted a kind of wait-and-see approach, which will make the change more gradual. Though Egypt has been a stable, predictable actor since the late 1970s, serving as the leading mediator in Middle Eastern affairs, all of this is about to change. This regional role has been contingent to a large extent on Mubarak. And since there is no other country that can replace Egypt as the "leader of the Arab world," the coming transition needs to be prudently and patiently thought out.
While the United States has yet to align itself with an alternative political force in Egypt, sorting as it is through the medley of secularists and Islamists who share the support of the Egyptian public, the Bush administration has decided it will not continue to rely on a regime that is about to undergo a metamorphosis at a time when a democratic wave has been set in motion.
Already engaged in pushing democracy in the region, the Bush administration is using this broad policy to ensure a relatively smooth transition in Cairo. More important, the envisioned transition is not meant to be merely cosmetic -- which often has been the case in the past, when the United States did not want to rock the boat of Egypt's entire political system. What Washington seeks to achieve now is a permanent fix in which a democratic system of sorts is put in place that will spare Washington from having to worry about shoring up unpopular regimes.
This is markedly different from the U.S. approach to Syria, where Washington seeks regime change because the incumbent leadership is engaged in behavior that is upsetting U.S. plans for the region. Similarly, in Saudi Arabia it is oil and the threat of militant Islamism that has Washington satisfied with the piecemeal and gradual approach of the Saudis. Moreover, there are no viable alternatives to the Saudi royal family, which is now an institution that has the potential of keeping things in order in Saudi Arabia for some time to come. In Egypt, however, one man has more or less kept affairs in order for 24 years. So the question is: Who or what does the United States have in mind as a replacement for the Mubarak order?
Here is where the lessons of Iraq can come in handy. Without a military invasion and with far less violence, Washington can cobble together a coalition of secularists and Islamists that can take over the government of Egypt. A key difference that can complicate matters is that the Egyptian groups do not enjoy the same amount of leverage within the country that the Iraqi Shia and Kurds do.
Notwithstanding the complexity of the task, the Bush administration has changed its attitude toward Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes, and there is no going back. In Egypt, change is happening regardless of U.S. moves. It remains to be seen whether that change will be in keeping with U.S. expectations.
Posted by Ted Belman at May 23, 2005 01:55 PM