The Gaza Withdrawal and Israel's Permanent Dilemma

The Gaza Withdrawal and Israel's Permanent Dilemma

By George Friedman, the chairman of STRATFOR, a consulting firm that specializes in providing businesses with private intelligence, analysis, and forecasting of international events. A frequent lecturer, Friedman is also the author of two books, "Intelligence Edge" and "The Future of War."

(This is a brilliant analysis of Israel's dilemma. I am very much interested in what you readers have to say. Essentially Friedman says there are two threats of importance to Israel. Is increased terror, due to disengagement, the biggest threat to Israel or is the biggest threat to Israel, the negative results of the occupation on Israel. This would include greater animosity in Europe leading to sanctions and the like, UNSC Chapter 7 resolutions, increased US pressure and finally greater determination amoung the Arab states to re-arm and to develope the bomb. Sharon believes that Israel can handle the increased terror but would have much more difficulty handling a more hostile world which is sure to follow a continued occupation. What say you? Ted Belman)

[...]This [demography] poses the first geopolitical dilemma for Israel: Whatever the historical, moral or religious arguments, the fact was that at the beginning of the 20th century, the land identified as the Jewish homeland -- Palestine -- was inhabited overwhelmingly by Arabs. A Jewish and democratic state could be achieved only by a demographic transformation. Either more Jews would have to come to Palestine, or Arabs would have to leave, or a combination of the two would have to occur. The Holocaust caused Jews who otherwise would have stayed in Europe to come to Palestine. The subsequent creation of the state of Israel caused Arabs to leave, and Jews living in Arab countries to come to Israel.

However, this demographic shift was incomplete, leaving Israel with two strategic problems. First, a large number of Arabs, albeit a minority, continued to live in Israel. Second, the Arab states surrounding Israel -- which perceived the state as an alien entity thrust into their midst -- viewed themselves as being in a state of war with Israel. Ultimately, Israel's problem was that dealing with the external threat inevitably compounded the internal threat.

Israel's Strategic Disadvantage
Israel was at a tremendous strategic disadvantage. First, it was vastly outnumbered in the simplest sense: There were many more Arabs who regarded themselves as being in a state of war with Israel than there were Jews in Israel. Second, Israel had extremely long borders that were difficult to protect. Third, the Israelis lacked strategic depth. If all of their neighbors -- Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon -- were joined by the forces of more distant Arab and Islamic states, Israel would find it difficult to resist. And if all of these forces attacked simultaneously in a coordinated strike, Israel would find it impossible to resist.

Even if the Arabs did not carry out a brilliant stroke, cutting Israel in half on a Jerusalem-Tel Aviv line (a distance of perhaps 20 miles), Israel would still lose an extended war with the Arabs. If the Arabs could force a war of attrition on Israel, in which they could impose an attrition rate of perhaps 1 percent per day of forces on the forward edge of the battle area, Israel would not be able to hold for more than a few months at best. In the 20th century, an attrition rate of that level, in a battle space the size of Israel, would be modest. Israel's effective forces rarely numbered more than 250,000 men -- the other 250,000 were older reserves with inferior equipment. Extended attritional warfare was not an option for Israel.

Thus, in order for Israel to survive, three conditions were necessary:

1. The Arabs must never unite into a single, effective force.
2. Israel must choose the time, place and sequence of any war.
3. Israel must never face both a war and an internal uprising of Arabs simultaneously.

Israel's strategy was to use diplomacy to prevent the three main adversaries -- Egypt, Jordan and Syria -- from simultaneously choosing to launch a war. From its founding, Israel always maintained a policy of splitting the front-line states. This was not particularly difficult, given the deep animosities among the Arabs. For example, Israel always maintained a special relationship with Jordan, which had unsatisfactory relations with its own neighbors. Early on, Israel worked to serve as the guarantor of the Jordanian regime's survival. Later, after the Camp David Accords split Egypt off from the Arab coalition, Israel had neutralized two out of three of its potential adversaries. The dynamics of Arab geopolitics and the skill of Israeli diplomacy achieved an outcome that is rarely appreciated. From its founding, Israel managed to prevent simultaneous warfare with its neighbors except at a time and place of its own choosing. It had to maintain a military force capable of taking the initiative in order to have a diplomatic strategy.

But throughout most of its history, Israel had a fundamental challenge in achieving this preeminence.

Israel's Geopolitical Problem
The state's military preeminence had to be measured against the possibility of diplomatic failure. Israel had to assume that all front-line states would become hostile to it, and that it would have to launch a preemptive strike against them all. If this were the case, Israel had this dilemma: Its national industrial base was insufficient to provide it with the technological wherewithal to maintain its military superiority. It was not simply a question of money --all the money in the world could not change the demographics -- but also that Israel lacked the manpower to produce all of the weapons it needed to have and also to field an army. Therefore, Israel could survive only if it had a patron that possessed such an industrial base. Israel had to make itself useful to another country.

Israel's first patron was the Soviet Union, through its European satellites. Its second patron was France, which saw Israel as an ally during a time when Paris was trying to hold onto its interests in an increasingly hostile Arab world. Its third patron -- but not until 1967 -- was the United States, which saw Israel as a counterweight to pro-Soviet Egypt and Syria, as well as a useful base of operations in the eastern Mediterranean.

In 1967, Israel -- fearing a coordinated strike by the Arabs and also seeking to rationalize its defensive lines and create strategic depth -- launched an air and land attack against its neighbors. Rather than risk a coordinated attack, Israel launched a sequential attack -- first against Egypt, then Jordan, then Syria.

The success of the 1967 war gave rise to Israel's current geopolitical crisis.

Following the war, Israel had to balance three interests:

1. It now occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which contained large, hostile populations of Arabs. A full, peripheral war combined with an uprising in these regions would cut Israeli lines of supply and communication and risk Israel's defeat.
2. Israel was now dependent on the United States for its industrial base. But American interests and Israeli interests were not identical. The United States had interests in the Arab world, and had no interest in Israel crushing Palestinian opposition or expelling Palestinians from Israel. Retaining the industrial base and ruthlessly dealing with the Palestinians became incompatible needs.
3. Israel had to continue manipulating the balance of power among Arab states in order to prevent a full peripheral war. That, in turn, meant that it was further constrained in dealing with the Palestinian question by force.

Israeli geopolitics created the worst condition of all: Given the second and third considerations, Israel could not crush the Palestinians; but given its need for strategic depth and coherent borders, it could not abandon the occupied territories. It therefore had to continually constrain the Palestinians without any possibility of final victory. It had to be ruthless, which would enflame the Palestinians, but it could never be ruthless enough to effectively suppress them.

The Impermanence of Diplomacy
Israel has managed to maintain the diplomatic game it began in 1948: The Arabs remain deeply split. It has managed to retain its relationship with the United States, even with the end of the Cold War. Given the decline of the conventional threat, Israel's dependency on the United States has actually dwindled. For the moment, the situation is contained.

However -- and this is the key problem for Israel -- the diplomatic solution is inherently impermanent. It requires constant manipulation, and the possibility of failure is built in. For example, an Islamist rising in Egypt could rapidly generate shifts that Israel could not contain. Moreover, political changes in the United States could end American patronage, without the certainty of another patron emerging. These things are not likely to occur, but they are not inconceivable. Given enough time, anything is possible.

Israel's advantage is diplomatic and cultural. Its ability to split the Arabs, a diplomatic force, is coupled with its technological superiority, a cultural force. But both of these can change. The Arabs might unite, and they might accelerate their technological and military sophistication. Israel's superiority can change, but its inferiority is fixed: Geography and demography put it in an unchangeably vulnerable position relative to the Arabs.

The potential threats to Israel are:

1. A united and effective anti-Israeli coalition among the Arabs.
2. The loss of its technological superiority and, therefore, the loss of military initiative.
3. The need to fight a full peripheral war while dealing with an intifada within its borders.
4. The loss of the United States as patron and the failure to find an alternative.
5. A sudden, unexpected nuclear strike on its populated heartland.

Therefore, it follows that Israel has three options.

The first is to hope for the best. This has been Israel's position since 1967. The second is to move from conventional deterrence to nuclear deterrence. Israel already possesses this capability, but the value of nuclear weapons is in their deterrent capability, not in their employment. You can't deal with an intifada or with close-in conventional war with nuclear weapons -- not given the short distances involved in Israel. The third option is to reduce the possibility of disaster as far as possible by increasing the tensions in the Arab world, reducing the incentive for cultural change among the Arabs, eliminating the threat of intifada in time of war, and reducing the probability that the United States will find it in its interests to break with Israel

Hence, the withdrawal from Gaza. As a base for terrorism, Gaza poses a security threat to Israel. But the true threat from Gaza, and even more the West Bank, lies in the fact that they create a dynamic that decreases Israel's diplomatic effectiveness, risks creating Arab unity, increases the impetus for military modernization and places stress on Israel's relationship with the United States. The terrorist threat is painful. The alternative risks long-term catastrophe.

Some of the original reasons for Israel's founding, such as the desire for a socialist state, are now irrelevant to Israeli politics. And revisionism, like socialism, is a movement of the past. Modern Israel is divided into three camps:

1. Those who believe that the survival of Israel depends on disengaging from a process that enrages without crushing the Palestinians, even if it opens the door to terrorism.
2. Those who regard the threat of terrorism as real and immediate, and regard the longer-term strategic threats as theoretical and abstract.
3. Those who have a religious commitment to holding all territories.

The second and third factions are in alliance but, at the moment, it is the first faction that appears to be the majority. It is not surprising that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is leading this faction. As a military man, Sharon has a clear understanding of Israel's vulnerabilities. It is clearly his judgment that the long-term threat to Israel comes from the collapse of its strategic position, rather than from terrorism. He has clearly decided to accept the reality of terrorist attacks, within limits, in order to pursue a broader strategic initiative.

Israel has managed to balance the occupation of a hostile population with splitting Arab nation states since 1967. Sharon's judgment is that, given the current dynamics of the Muslim world, pursuing the same strategy for another generation would be both too costly and too risky. The position of his critics is that the immediate risks of disengagement increase the immediate danger to Israel without solving the long-term problem. If Sharon is right, then there is room for maneuver. But if his critics, including Benjamin Netanyahu, are right, Israel is locked down to an insoluble problem.

That is the real debate.

Posted by Ted Belman at August 17, 2005 11:58 PM

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Comments

1. sk said:

Oh golly Ted, there you go again. There are so many levels of error in this guy's "brilliant" analysis that it is breathtaking. But I'm tired, so I'll mention the one that springs to mind: a simplistic reliance on the assumption that internal nation state political processes are reduceable to a particular, coherent, detailed, decades-long "rational" narrative. The classic study of the use of multiple interpretive models is Graham Allison's book on the Cuban Missile Crisis. I suppose I should add that, uh, Arab armies HAVE fought together against Israel. They just weren't very good at it.

Posted by: sk on August 17, 2005 12:58 AM

2. dr. pangloss said:

while the arguments sound cogent, the data support the classical interpretation - control of land trumps the promise of diplomatic gestures.

during the intifada - israel's economy boomed except when terror was epidemic. once terror attacks were beaten down, the economy grew. thus, israel's economy boomed in spite of world-wide condemnation or demonization. rescinding the UN resolution or surrendering southern lebanon did not improve Israel's military or economic strength. (And unilateral withdrawal from gaza will not result from either more peace and consequent economic boom, or economic growth with continued intifada. Next, come calls for "disengagement" from Yesha, and then Jerusalem.

Note that in the face of "disengagement," calls for boycotting Israel re-surfaced. the g

israel's existence (as is the western world) is at stake. europe suffers existentially from bad demographics (declining white population, ever increasing muslim population), while the us and israel (and other countries along the way who are allied with the us) suffer existentially from terror and the imminent threat of casualties from weapons of mass destruction.

the western-islam war will continue for the next generation - who knows who will win, but israel's unilateral withdrawal from gaza will signify a victory for terrorism and islamofascism locally and will add nothing substantive to the global war on terror.

the united states will continue to support israel. the state department is entrenched with arabists, but you have 50 million fundamental christians. in a generation, when the US becomes hispanic, that may or may not have any effect on us-israel relations. many hispanics are in the armed forces, and many have been killed - interestingly, the hispanic community has not been notable in public protests. in other words, the catholic hispanic community may not be appreciably different when it comes to supporting the global war on terror. hence us-israel relations may not be affected at all.

israel's strategic position will always be driven by its military, intellectual, and economic strength. israel's ability to destroy mecca, baghdad, tehran, cairo, damascus will serve its strategic competitive advantage. once arabs can put together two small nuclear bombs and deliver them to tel aviv and jerusalem - that advantage dissipates.
the difficult decision is for israel's leaders, contrast 1967 with 1973, when does israel strike first in a conventional war, and how does israel insure that a nuclear option does not become feasible for the arab world. in that case, it is in the mindset of the bush administration (but not that of a clinton administration) to slow down the nuclear plans of the arab world. a more serious threat to israel is whether american policy in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to the muslim world will change when bush leaves office (and til then what can bush do more aggressively to halt the iran's or north korea's nuclear programs.

Posted by: dr. pangloss on August 17, 2005 02:09 AM

3. julie said:

what are they really fighting for. Seem's to me that it's more pride than anything. any truth to this. please explain

Posted by: julie on August 17, 2005 03:09 AM

4. denaili said:

Again, this squable is nonsense. It's like trying to persuade someone who does'nt like brocolli to to eat it. As mundane as that sounds, come on. . . we all came from the same place, are going to the same place. .. and if you think you're special and should be placed or given a key to some higher place. . you're out of you're frickin mind.! Good intentions. that's it. If you don't know what that is, see you in many many many more lives. The end.!

Posted by: denaili on August 17, 2005 03:46 AM

5. Kin said:

What this does show is the complete lack of morality in the American position. America has very little to gain from a Palestinian state or for that matter from the continuation of the Palestinian problem. As a matter of fact, the opposite is true. If it was taken care of swiftly and harshly in one fell swoop, it would be over and done with and the Arab countries would no longer be able to make use of the plight of the Palestinians (which they themselves caused) for their own nefarious purposes. So there is no moral standing to America pressuring Israel on the Palestinian front.

Posted by: Kin on August 17, 2005 04:16 AM

6. Maurice Sonnenwirth said:

A few points:

It's a very good analysis of the overall picture, of the problems Israel faces, and why disengagement is one wager that may...may be utlimately smart in the long run, even as emotionally it is a horrible thing to watch. I can barely watch or read the news stories, I am so sickened to see what is going on. But that is an emotional response, not a strategic one, as the STRATFOR report goes into.

Does this particular option work? I have no idea myself. I think Israel must stand firmer in the face of the rest of the world, who seem to continue to want to push Israel in any direction THEY think is good, rather than good for Israel. The United States, in the guise of a protector and friend, may be in some ways, the worst of the bunch. Better the enemy that reveals itself than the friend who is not such a friend. And I think we are seeing that to some extent now, with the pressure of a Condi Rice when she berated Israeli leadership for not wanting to give bulletts to the PA!

Israel needs to present a strong front, a more united front. Pick her friends who are really friends and to NOT be reliant on one country, especially in a time of weakness in that country, and I percieve the U.S. to be more weak even in its hubris that it is the only superpower. I don't think the U.S. should be ignored or cast aside, but as has been aptly documented on Israpundit, the U.S. has NOT always been a smart or dependable ally in terms of decision making for Israel.

Israel must do what's right for Israel. History has taught that lesson. Israel must become economically and politically free as much as possible from being beholden to anyone. It has made strides in that direction, but it is even more vital now.

As for the analysis that Sharon is picking a strategic position that might allow for more terror, but keeps Israel in an otherwise superior strategic position militarily and politically....we can only pray that HIS gamble turns out to be the correct one. And it might. From that standpoint, as opposed to the emotional one, it is STILL possible that this disengagement turns out to be a smart move, if albeit a terribly painful move.

When I saw the pictures of the soldiers hugging...holding and crying with settlers, I saw a strength, a beauty, and I had a burst of hope that perhaps even in the terrible disunity of Israeli society, in the deep divisions of the Left and Right, there still is a basic feeling, hidden as it often is in the political rhetoric and the game of abusive discourse Israelis love to play, there is still a love of one Jew for another and for both those Jews for the Land, even if the overall reasons and viewpoints of what the Land mean is not exactly the same.

I saw real hope in those pictures. Perhaps that's the best part of what will go on. A national dialogue and a coming together of some of the people. I won't pretent this will unify everybody...but perhaps it brings together some of the disparate groups, that the IDF and police with the role of enforcers, movers, bouncers, still feel for their countrymen as their own, and...if its my fantasy, so be it, but perhaps in the long run, this strengthens Israeli society in a way that's more important in the long run than any of the other political ramifications of the STRATFORian or other analyses.

In the meantime, finally, I pray Sharon is taking the right gamble. I sincerely pray that those of us who have cringed and prayed against the disengagement, who are sickened by the scenes of the masked murderers of Hamas celebrating, who are sick at heart at watching the scenes of the beautiful housing and settlements, reclaimed from the sand, knowing they will revert to nothingness and ruin....I pray that all the grief will be worth it and the analysis of Sharon and others will be the correct on, and that this tremendous pain and agony, for agony it is, just to watch these scenes, and I can only imagine an iota of the pain of those whose homes are being taken from them, will be, in the long run, worth it.

Reply to Julie: Who are you asking the question of? What is the question about? The settlers? The Palestinians? The entire conflict? Whose pride? Those who oppose the disengagement? Can't answer your question, it is too vague. Israel fights for her life, for her existence. Is that too much to ask? Those who lived in Gush Katif asked to be able to stay in their homes they worked so hard to build and maintain, to have their own community, (and same goes for all the settlements in Gaza), to be left alone in peace by their neighbors who sought to annhilate them. Does that answer the question? Or do you want to know why the Gazan Palestinians needed to get rid of Neve Dekalim etc.? Pride? More like sheer Hatred. The Jews took up so little land space, and in a fairy tale world, if the Palestinians would court the Jews to share their technical expertise of how to do things, would say "brother, share our land and let's figure out how to enrich each other and our children and our children's children", rather than "we'll drive you into the sea and exact a heavy price in Zionist blood" as their rhetoric tends to drivel into....well, now I am just into heavy fantasyzing myself there.

Posted by: Maurice Sonnenwirth on August 17, 2005 04:17 AM

7. Felix Quigley said:

On this issue I always go back to the ideologies which were at the beginning of Israel. Many of the early leaders in Israel came out of the European Stalinist and Social Democratic movement which by the 40s already had historic betrayals draped around their shoulders, especially that of 1933, when the Communist and Social Democratic parties in Germany pre-Hitler had millions of members, absolutely huge party aparati, yet allowed Hitler to WALK into power without a shot being fired. It was an ideological collapse.

As evidenced in the history of Mapai this type of ideology lingered and in fact Sharon's parents (his home environment) were out of that ideology also. Peres also has not materialised out of thin air, he also has a history and ideological genetic code. This historical aspect is rarely touched on but it is real.

This explains why the left in Israel seems to be those who court a deal with terrorism while the right are those who want discussion, are opposed to state repression, want to open up the way to a more democratic government. It is a reversal of roles.

Israel can do little until it deals with this internal enemy. Secular in the hands of these Lefts seems to be not true secularism, but a crude attack on ALL religion, and on Judaism in particular. They do not worry, such is their bigotry, that they are attacking the very Judaic ideology and faith that held the Jews together through millenia of suppression by the Christians and Muslims.

What is happening in Gaza, and if Sharon had sent Rice packing as he should have done it would not have happened, is an absolute catastrophe.

It is not the numbers it is the principle.

The young Jewish people who campaign on the streets, talk to soldiers about what they are doing, know far better than the above "analyst" what is involved and what is needed.

I repeat again there are millions and millions who will respond to the Jewish people's plight. But the anti-Semites and anarcho-fascists on the Left have had a field day.

This reactionary Left in Israel, these secularists, have failed totally over the past half century in putting Israel's case.

Same now this very moment! For example, there is now huge distrust among the youth of this world towards Britain the EU and America. Yet we have these Americans like Ward and Rice urging surrender to terrorists and galivanting about in the most arrogant way inside Israel itself doing so. We have Blair and his wife doing the same. Meanwhile they CLAIM to be fighting terror.

Do these Israeli Mapaistas bother to explain to the world what is happening in front of their eyes. No! Why not? Because they are reactionary, tied to public opinion, tied to what the world media think etc.

No! Sharon to my mind does epitomise all of this. I am convinced he is a narrow-minded conventionalist, tied totally to world opinion, hangs on to the coat-tails of Bush.

A proper Israeli Government would now be focussing on Iran, propagandising the Iranian intentions for their nuclear bomb, one or two would solve the Israeli problem a leader said.

But what did Sharon do? He attacked his own people, and even more serious presents that picture to the youth and intelligentia of this world, ie non-Jews. Jews must realise that we are all in this together. Sharon and this whole layer in Israeli society will never take that approach. They have never broken from those and that ideology that opened the door in 1933.

Posted by: Felix Quigley on August 17, 2005 05:24 AM

8. Badge 2211 [TypeKey Profile Page] said:

Where oh where did the Jihad go? How could any discussion about Muslim goals be addressed without ever mentioning Jihad? Gaza is not the issue because Arabs have flooded the strip and since 1967 it went from Jewish land to Palestine in the mind of the world. It's all a false construct.

As America takes down one Muslim regime after another doesn't anyone wonder whether Gaza isn't the issue? Muslims cannot abide losing land they once occupied or conquered, real and imagined (Jerusalem). We've toppled Saddam and yet, to everyone's surprise, the Iraqis still hate Israel. Jews are Nazified in the Muslim and Western Left's mind and giving up Gaza will not change that one iota. In fact, Israel's enemies smell fear and nothing will change for the better with either party after the Disengagement. Will the Christian Churches divesting themselves stop and now reverse course? Are you holding your breath?

I never thought my generation would see any sondercommandos, yet the pictures and videos I see today of the Gaza Disengagement plainly shows just that. Worse still, the chief sondercommando sits in the Prime Minister's seat.

Posted by: Badge 2211 [TypeKey Profile Page] on August 17, 2005 09:10 AM

9. Ted Belman said:

The following comment comes from a security professional.

"A leopard can't change it's spots. Once Israel is out of Gaza ,the terrorists will fill the void. Sharon will say we tried to move the peace process forward but look what we are dealing with-so it will go on and on.

Bottom line -anybody who thinks giving up a sliver of land is going to result in permanent peae is dreaming.

They don't want Israel to exist period and because of their backing by oil states,they put pressure on europe and the USA to pressure Israel. Israel has to remain strong and have allies like India. Nobody looks at the support of terrorists, including the Saudis still funding terrorists and extremists,in North America and elsewhere. All the focus has been on Israel because of the massive propaganda campaign."

Posted by: Ted Belman on August 17, 2005 09:50 AM

10. Ted Belman said:

Beth Goodtree writes,

"If you've noticed, I have been fairly silent as of late on the disengagement. When it was first announced over a year ago, I put forth 2 probable reasons and scenarios surrounding it. As I wrote back then, I still think there is a good chance that this whole thing is a ploy to sucker the Arabs into attacking. If they do (and I'm certain that trying to get those particular Arabs to be peaceful is like trying to teach a pig to sing), then Israel, having withdrawn, will have every right to wipe them off the face of the earth.

Of course, the timing was also perfect to distract the public from the crook Sharon and his dirty dealings.

However, this guy's analysis fails to take into account that for many in Europe, anything short of the total dissolution of Israel will be met with criticism."

Posted by: Ted Belman on August 17, 2005 10:14 AM

11. Ted Belman said:

Bernice Lipkin writes
Editor, Think-Israel"


Dear Ted

I assume that the George Friedman who authored this article is the Stratfor Friedman. It has the tone - pompous, seemingly authorative and emphasizing the wrong syLABble.

Friedman emphasiizes that the Arabs were in majority - this is only because they were flooding into "Palestine" because of the Jewish aliyah and then British control. The Jewish momentum was important for the area, waking up a medieval culture and starting a whole new ballgame. He ignores that when the ME was redivided after WW1, mandated Palestine was to be for the Jews. He ignores that Israel has international law on its side.
But it has never put the effort into setting the terms of the argument that the Arabs have.

Israel also has had internal dissensions - trying to define itself. As Friedman says, there's tension between being Jewish and being democratic. On the other hand, it is just as true to say it is becoming more Jewish and more democratic. It is in the process of shedding its marxist skin (40% of the army is religious) and growing an authentic Jewish style of life - and the "settlers" are the role models of this new vibrancy. And if the Gaza expulsion does nothing else good, it will teach the country that they can't rely on implicit controls (what is considered decent and part of the national character) in politics and especially in the judiary. They are going to have to spell out the checks and balances in a constitution.

Friedman sounds like Clausowitz gone to seed.

1. For Israel to survive, he says: the Arabs mustn't unite.
True, but warfare is becoming decentralized. So it is true that a concentrated Arab force would not be good, but the major and real problem is that a few hundred well-organized and well-funded people these days can do a lot of warring.

2. Israel must choose the time and place for war. Huh? Only time that happened was in 1956 when Israel teamed up with England and France to unblock the Suez Canal and the US stopped them. More typical - Israel was almost clobbered in the Yom Kippur war because Goldy Meier listened to USA, who told her not to move when the Arabs had alread began the war.

3. Can't have war and internal uprising. The internal uprising could have been squashed in a couple of days.
Why wasn't it? Maybe because the oldskin - the marxists who still have the top spots in the military, much of politics and the judiciary - have more regard for the new "Palestinians" than they do for Jews who like being Jewish. Maybe because Israel didn't want to rock the international boat. Instead, during the intifada, Israel trained the PA Arabs. I don't mean Israel intended to but it didn't use effective force and so the Arabs became less afraid and learned techniques, graduating from stones to missiles. Can Israel be effective? Sure, look at the psychological as well as military techniques they've used in the territories - including demonizing and terrorizing the settlers and trying to make the residents lose confidence.

Real problem has been that Israel is still in its new identity growth and not fully united. But Friedman must know that whenever they've had a chance to show what they want, the people have rejected giving up land.
THey picked Sharon in the election because Mitzna, his opponent, wanted unilateral disengagement and Sharon was forcefully against leaving the territories unilaterally or maybe at all.

Israel made a dreadful mistake allowing Oslo - the PLO has tried to clobber every host country it's been in - and it did the same in Israel. More to the point, Oslo made the pretense that the Palestinian arabs were a people seem real. It made it seem as if the quarrel was between Israel and this mythical Palestinian people. The quarrel is between the rejectionist Arab states and Israel. If Israel were really playing an intelligent strategy game, she wouldn't approach the problem of defusing a bunch of psycho neighbors by focussing on their stalking horse, the Palestinian Arabs.

By giving up territory unilaterally, Israel has put herself in a dreadful position diplomatically. Bush isn't doing well in Iraq and here Israel is giving him an opportunity to look effective. So of course, he will push on Israel and demand she give up more - Sameria, Judea, parts of Jerusalem. If politicians only focused on long range national interests and not opportunistically on the short term, would Bush have allowed Sharon to start the disengagement? At best it will only weaken and not destroy the only democracy in the ME. It also shows the world that America is not that serious about fighting Islamic terrorists, who are acting in concordance with the Muslim religion. But, then, we diffused the war against terrorism from day 2, when Bush announced that Islam was a peaceful religion.

Posted by: Ted Belman on August 17, 2005 01:11 PM

12. Ed D said:

I definately approve the arguments of Felix and Bernice. Sharon, in a criminal way, tries to hang on to Bush's coat tail, knowing full well that Bush is playing both sides against the middle. Bush and Sharon, both are trying for a distraction. Bush because he is weak in the eyes of the world and is putting his chips on Arabian oil. With the price of oil blasting out of the roof, he has dealt a losing hand. Sharon on the other hand, has been dealing in illegal practices with his son and is looking for eyes to be diverted from his dealings. As and ex military man, an axium almost always used by the military is: A. Never give up land you have conquered by spilt blood, or
B. If it must be, it must be a ploy with a plan to retake the territory at the expense of the enemy. i.e. a trap.
Israel, with unity and great leadership, must divorced itself from dependence of other nations by increasing it's defensable area. Instead of removing Israelis from their land,Israel should have expelled the Arabs of Gaza, leaving only the West Bank to control.
Having done this, Israel would have had more land for heavy industry, improving their financial stability, but would also provide the ability to create more and better weapons for defence. Israelis built a war plane called Kfir, but were force by the US to stop production so the US could produce the aircraft (F-16, 15 and 18s) for sale. Israel probably has the capacity to make an improved aircraft on it's own. She must learn to stand on her own two feet.

Posted by: Ed D on August 17, 2005 02:48 PM

13. Nathan Shuster said:

In his rather somber scenario, George Friedmann has omitted one important factor, and that is the yet-to-be-determined outcome of American efforts to drain the Islamofascist swamp. Should this historic and heroic attempt at changing the political culture of Arab societies be crowned with success, many of the contingencies explored in this article will simply evaporate. We as Jews, and all others who are friends of Israel and civilization, need to do what we can to support this enterprise, and not find ourselves in the ranks of those who continue to sabotage this herculean task.
Victory in Iraq will change the political, economic and military scenery in the Middle East. Defeat will present us with a darker future.
Nothing is eternal, except, perhaps, the miraculous existence of the Jewish people (and the inexplicable presence of their enemies).
Nathan Shuster,
Toronto.

Posted by: Nathan Shuster on August 17, 2005 04:37 PM

14. Dr Gabriel Dekel said:

Although interesting the analysis seems as a script of Israel defence strategy written in the 1970s. I will try to shift the focus to what I see as more relevant and current.

In many respects – the Intifadas have been a result of Israel success to eliminate the prospects of a wider regional war. The peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan had created a perception that peace is achievable and that the Arabs intention is indeed to achieve a co-existence with israel. Gone was the perception of heroic Israel fighting for its life against all odds. Consequently Israel was forced to abandon its effective means of suppression, and it was entrapped in a unwinable war against the Palestinian Arabs. At present the prospects of external war are low and the defence priority now must seek a complete defeat of the current enemy, not just a containment of the Intifada war. The Intifada war may spill over and drag neighbouring countries, although the chances that Syria will enter into a coalition with a possible Muslim ruled Egypt, are low given the American presence in Iraq. The focus now is on the Intifada, and Disengagement is a tactical manoeuvre to win the war. The war from hereon will follow the same routines as in 1948. One can recall the disastrous consequences to the enemy in 1948 when rules of engagement where different. These rules will be re-introduced after Disengagement.


Posted by: Dr Gabriel Dekel on August 17, 2005 07:56 PM

15. Jonathan said:

The entire fallacy regarding the argument made under the heading of “Israel's Strategic Disadvantage” is that Israel has always been in danger due to the enemy’s strength in numbers. My rebuttal to that argument can be found in Leviticus, chapter 26, versus 7 & 8. But the entire fallacy of the entire article is trying to make sense out of Israel’s present-day problems through some kind of geopolitical modern logic. The entire chapter 26 in the book of Leviticus spells it out clearly. If the Jews honor God, follow his statutes and commandments, then God will bless their nation and protect them. However, if the Jews do not live up to their covenant with God, then God will punish them and appoint terror (as in modern-day “terrorism”) over them as mentioned in verse 16 of chapter 26 in Leviticus.

For all of those of you out there who would put down this argument, then answer me this---what then was the entire point of God freeing the ancient tribes of the Israelites from bondage? My answer to this question is that God freed the Israelites from bondage in order to make them the chosen nation to pass on God’s laws to the world. And secondly, once God freed the ancient Israelites, HE gave them a land of their own, Canaan.

That’s the whole essence to my argument, it was God that willed the ancient Israelites into their destiny. And thus, the Jewish people’s destiny is and always has been intertwined with their relationship and duties to God. The Jewish people collectively are known from the bible as Israel, meaning that who struggle with God. Thus, trying to somehow equate modern-day logic regarding the struggles of the actual country of Israel is a futile argument. Because in the end, the nation of Israel (the actual Jewish people) can really only be saved by living up to it duties and commitments to God; HE that gave them their nation in the first place.

The nation of Israel is unlike any nation on earth because it wasn’t a man-made creation. It didn’t set-up its own articles of laws, God did. And unlike any nation on the face of the earth, unless the nation of Israel keeps its covenant, it will not know peace. That’s all---peace isn’t contingent on making peace with its enemies nor giving up land but by solely honoring God and living up to HIS laws---period!!

Posted by: Jonathan on August 17, 2005 10:41 PM

16. radiorote said:

Dr. Friedman brings about a discourse which is, both at once, reasonable to where many interested parties are already aware of the problems -- as well as being able to tie together these issues and take an 'intellectual leap in the dark' towards an rational assessment of the issues at hand.

Israel is similar to Germany in the sense that it has many neighbors and most, throughout history, showed hostility towards both of them. (In Germany's case, it was mostly self-inflicted).

Therefore, both are highly sensitive towards the movements and consensus of its neighbors. Their strategy depends upon on taking the first initiative against their neighbors. This may be done through covert or overt means.

The Mossad understands this and remains one the better intelligence agencies around. The UK has a better agency, but their responsibilities cover a larger part of the world. What makes the Mossad a success is that they focus upon regional issues. Because they are regional, they can spend more resources on keeping their enemies at bay in ordder to prevent a long lasting united front. This is generated through the use of agitation, misinformation, penetration and other standard psy-op methods.

This, in turn, as Dr. Friedman points out, works for Israel on a diplomatic and battle-ready level.

All countries with the resources depend upon this strategy, with Russia, for example, having many successes in this area in the past.

Where Israel fails is on a propoganda level. The Arabs out perform them in this area and has caused a PR problem for them around the world. Pulling out of Gaza is also seen as a way to counter this problem.

Although the EU has been critical of Israel, they are still a major trading partner. However, the perception the EU has about Israel still inhibits Jerusalem from forming better ties with that Ozmandian Union.

Based on demographic, perceptual and economic principals -- as well as selling out to Bush and Bandar, Israel is withdrawing from Gaza and probably the West Bank.

Dr. Friedman is correct in 'naming the name' whether it matches our sensitivites or not. Real Politik demands that countries have brief encounters with other countries when it suits thier needs, as opposed to long term friendships. Where once the UK was the donator of heavy water that allowed Israel to develop nuclear missiles, they now have an Arabist government.

Israel is on the down-side of the hill now and is trying desperately to resolve the problems of international condemnation, even on the most incorrect and simplist levels.
They accusations set against Israel may not be true, but nations believe it to be so.

One may be reminded of Freud who believed that even if a patient who complains about pain, has no real pain -- the roots of the misguided belief must be explored and eased.

Even if the world is half-crocked and nuerotic on the issue of Israel, Israel believes it must explore ways to change the viewpoint of the world.

It is a risky venture because, as the addage goes, one cannot always argue with a sick mind.

Posted by: radiorote on August 18, 2005 04:25 AM

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