Joseph Schick writes along similar lines in The Jewish Press "How the Rabin Murder Saved Oslo and Hurt Yesha." Schick's article reminds us of the historical context. He reminds us of Rabin in the elections of 1992 and his platform and promises in dealing with terrorism. He also reminds us of what actions Rabin took--and did not take--after taking office. Schick recalls events in Israel following Oslo in 1993, the terrorism, the reaction of Israelis and some of Rabin's responses to Israelis who protested. Rabin by the end of 1995 was not popular: "While the November 4, 1995, pro-Oslo rally in Tel Aviv attracted a large crowd, Rabin was then trailing Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu in opinion polls, as had been the case throughout the prior year." But the assassination changed all that.

Certainly, the murder of Rabin had the opposite effect of the murderer`s intention. Contrary to conventional wisdom – that Yigal Amir killed the “peace process” – the assassination in fact rendered Rabin a martyr and Oslo irreversible, and caused severe damage to the settlement movement.

...the assassination of Rabin that night galvanized the Israeli Left and marginalized the Right, particularly the religious Zionist sector and the Yesha movement. The notion took hold that any and all left-wing political stances – including those Rabin had rejected – had to be implemented to support Rabin's memory and legacy.

But the question is what is Rabin's legacy? What were his plans for Israel in light of Oslo? According to Schick, people have largely forgotten. Thus The Jewish Week on Octobe 28, 2005 wrties:

Rabin, the military man turned prime minister, endorsed the Oslo Accords with Yasir Arafat, pledging an independent state for the Palestinians in return for peace with Israel.

Not true, writes Schick:

That is a widespread misperception. In fact, Rabin was always opposed to the formation of a Palestinian state, to any division of Jerusalem, or to any concessions on the Jordan Valley. His political red lines remained guided by the Allon Plan under which Israel would retain around thirty percent of Judea and Samaria.

As proof, he points to a Knesset Speech Rabin gave on October 5, 1995. Here is the relevant part of that speech. An extended excerpt of it can be found at The Foundation for Middle East Peace. The parts of that speech that Schick points to are in bold:

We view the permanent solution in the framework of the State of Israel which will include most of the area of the Land of Israel as it was under the rule of the British Mandate, and alongside it a Palestinian entity which will be a home to most of the Palestinian residents living in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. We would like this to be an entity which is less than a state, and which will independently run the lives of the Palestinians under its authority. The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six-Day War. We will not return to the June 4, 1967, lines.

And these are the main changes, not all of them, which we envision and want in the permanent solution:

o First and foremost, united Jerusalem, which will include both Ma'ale Adumim and Givat Ze'ev--as the capital of Israel, under Israeli sovereignty, while preserving the rights of the members of the others faiths, Christianity and Islam, to freedom of access and freedom of worship in their holy places, according to the customs of their faiths.

o The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term.

o Changes which will include the addition of Gush Etzion, Efrat, Betar and other communities, most of which are in the area east of what was the "Green Line," prior to the Six-Day War.

o The establishment of blocs of settlements in Judea and Samaria, like the one in Gush Katif. . . .

In terms of Gaza, keep in mind that Rabin already did the withdrawl from Gaza as part of the "Gaza – Jericho First Plan". According to Morton Klein of ZOA:

In 1994, under Oslo's Gaza – Jericho First Plan, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin withdrew from 88% of Gaza where the 1 million Palestinians live. The 9,000 Jews in Gaza live in the remaining 12% of Gaza that remains under Israeli control, which is in a narrow strip along the Mediterranean. These areas include only 2,000 Palestinians Arabs. There is no demographic benefit to Israel ceding an area that is 82% Jewish

Although Rabin's October speech was given only a month before his assassination, it may be claimed that Rabin might have changed his mind and viewed things differently. On this point Schick notes:

It is possible that Rabin would have taken a different approach in final status negotiations, as Ehud Barak later did at Camp David and Taba. But it is noteworthy that Rabin's stance on Jerusalem and avoiding a return to the 1967 borders remained unchanged after he had recognized the PLO and signed Oslo and Oslo 2. Even after his political shift, Rabin maintained principled red lines in his vision for Israel`s permanent eastern borders.

The point is not so much what Rabin might have done, but rather what obviously has been done and has happened as a result of the Rabin assassination. The increased hatred of the religious Jews in Israel is an undeniable result. The continuation along the road first opened by Rabin with increasing velocity and diminishing resistance is an apparent legacy of that cataclysmic day.

Meron Benevisti of Haaretz has some thoughts about that legacy and those who claim to have a share in it:

...there's no connection between the memory of Yitzhak Rabin or his action and the situation five years after his death. He left a double heritage - first, belief that only a gradual, incremental process would lead to conciliation and peace, and second, that mutual recognition of the legitimacy of two national movements fighting over the same homeland is the only ideological foundation on which to build a peace process.

Those who followed him betrayed that double legacy. Benjamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon disavowed both, and Ehud Barak sought to hasten the end, and was punished. None of them can hide behind Rabin's broad back, and the memory of the murdered leader does not need to be a ball fought over in a political court.

And, one might add--for those of a less sanguine view of Rabin's legacy--neither is there any point in besmirching the memory of what Rabin had honestly hoped to achieve.

See also Fallout of the Rabin Assassination--The Religious Right

Crossposted at Daled Amos

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