Rumors are circulating in Beirut that Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani made an unofficial visit to Lebanon prior to Jan. 9, the date on which Iran decided to remove U.N. seals and resume uranium enrichment research; the rumored visit and Iran's decision could well be linked. Iran has persistently signaled to Israel that it can hit close to home, and whenever Israel's border with Lebanon flares up with rocket fire Tehran uses the opportunity to up the ante on the nuclear controversy. This is similar to Iran's tactic of using its links with Iraq's Shiite militias -- and Iraq's Shiite community as a whole -- to remind the West that Tehran can incite attacks and mass uprisings if its geopolitical interests are not met.
Hezbollah -- created by Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards in 1982 to export the Islamic revolution to the Arab world -- receives financial, ideological and armed support from Iran and from the Islamic republic's Alawite allies in Syria, who share Tehran's interest in pressuring Israel. The organization was particularly useful in the days of the civil war when Lebanon was overrun with warring militias and crawling with U.S., Israeli and French security forces along with Palestinian Liberation Organization fighters. However, the assassination in 2005 of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri considerably altered the political landscape in Lebanon. A number of resulting complications have affected Hezbollah's ability -- and willingness -- to serve as an effective Iranian satellite.
Iran is apparently displeased with Hezbollah leader Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah's failure to demonstrate complete loyalty to the regime. Complaints are circulating in Iran's regime that Nasrallah receives more directives from Damascus than from Tehran. Nasrallah might be acting under increased pressure to demonstrate that Hezbollah is an Arab-Lebanese entity, but whatever the reason for his behavior, Iran allegedly is now aiming to replace Nasrallah and merge the pro-Syrian Shiite Amal movement with a revamped Hezbollah. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Iran is grooming Hezbollah's Hashim Safieddine to replace Nasrallah -- a move that could erupt into a major rift within the organization.
Iran's concerns over Nasrallah coincide with its diminishing confidence in Syrian President Bashar al Assad, whose regime has been humiliated relentlessly by the ongoing U.N. investigation into the al-Hariri killing and former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam's public display of defection. With Syria wrapped up in its own political tangle, Iran is setting out to secure a strong Shiite Lebanese bloc for itself -- beginning with its plan to consolidate support within Hezbollah.
Hezbollah has struggled to redefine itself as a Lebanese nationalist movement since the al-Hariri assassination. The group wants to avoid the touchy issue of disarmament and maintain its legitimacy as a resistance movement against Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon's Shebaa Farms, rather than be branded a "militia" and forced to disarm. To this end, Hezbollah has been using its political capital to negotiate with Saad al-Hariri -- Lebanon's leading Sunni political figure and son of the former prime minister -- to alter the government's stance toward fully implementing U.N. Resolution 1559, which calls for the disarmament of all Lebanese militias. Hezbollah and the Amal movement recently prompted a major Cabinet crisis and returned Lebanon to its usual political chaos when the government's Shiite ministers decided to boycott the Cabinet and gridlock the political system until the organization's demands are met. The Shiite ministers have refused to resign, and the prime minister cannot dismiss them -- which gives the Shiite bloc an effective bargaining tool to diminish international attempts to intervene in Lebanon, pressure the Syrian regime and force Hezbollah to disarm.
Adding to Hezbollah's difficulties is the growing presence of al Qaeda-linked militants attempting to set up a jihadist base in Lebanon. Lebanese security forces arrested 13 suspected al Qaeda members Jan. 13 and charged them with plotting terrorist attacks, forging documents and possessing weapons. It comes as no surprise that al Qaeda is attempting to build a presence in Lebanon. On Jan. 10, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al Qaeda in Iraq said in an Internet statement that it has waged "a new attack" against Israel by launching 10 Katyusha rockets from Lebanon into northern Israel "at the instructions of Osama bin Laden." As al Qaeda's Iraq node is threatened, the group faces more pressure to team up with dissident Palestinian militants in order to target Israel, penetrate al-Zarqawi's hometown in Jordan and develop an al Qaeda cell in Lebanon. Fledgling cells have already taken root in certain Palestinian refugee camps, such as Ain al-Hilweh in southern Lebanon.
Al Qaeda's major obstacle to setting up shop in Lebanon's mostly Shiite south is none other than Hezbollah, which views al Qaeda militants as encroaching on its territory. Hezbollah has serious ideological differences with al Qaeda and especially with al-Zarqawi, whose fighters have killed thousands of Shia in Iraq and reportedly have threatened to kill senior Shia Lebanese political and religious leaders. Al Qaeda's entry into the picture also complicates Hezbollah's relatively quiet resistance against Israel and its efforts to bolster its legitimacy as a political and military force working in Lebanon's interests.
Hezbollah's nature has changed significantly since the Lebanese civil war. Since then, the militant group has grown less useful to Iran as a counter to Israeli moves against Tehran. Though Iran highly values Hezbollah's physical threat to Israel, Tehran's big question as it charges forward with its nuclear campaign is whether Tel Aviv will consider Hezbollah a serious factor when it comes time for Israel to decide between rocket attacks from Lebanon and the larger threat of a nuclear-armed Iran.
Iran's Hezbollah Connection
Summary
Iran's calculus in pursuing its ambitious nuclear agenda undoubtedly involves its key asset based in Lebanon: Hezbollah. Although Hezbollah has proven a useful tool for Tehran in the past, the Iranian regime might not be able to rely fully on its militant Shiite allies in the Levant to offset the Israeli threat.
Analysis
As evidenced by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's bellicose statements involving the relocation of Israel, Tehran's nuclear ambitions are underscored with a great deal of confidence. Iran derives much of this confidence from its reliance on its militant creation in Lebanon: Hezbollah.
Part of Iran's strategy in pushing its nuclear agenda involves tactically using Hezbollah to deliver timely reminders to Israel that the militant group's large cache of Katyusha rockets can effectively counter any threats of military action against Tehran; though it cannot be confirmed, Hezbollah is believed to have missiles that can reach Haifa in northern Israel.
Rumors are circulating in Beirut that Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani made an unofficial visit to Lebanon prior to Jan. 9, the date on which Iran decided to remove U.N. seals and resume uranium enrichment research; the rumored visit and Iran's decision could well be linked. Iran has persistently signaled to Israel that it can hit close to home, and whenever Israel's border with Lebanon flares up with rocket fire Tehran uses the opportunity to up the ante on the nuclear controversy. This is similar to Iran's tactic of using its links with Iraq's Shiite militias -- and Iraq's Shiite community as a whole -- to remind the West that Tehran can incite attacks and mass uprisings if its geopolitical interests are not met.
Hezbollah -- created by Iran's elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards in 1982 to export the Islamic revolution to the Arab world -- receives financial, ideological and armed support from Iran and from the Islamic republic's Alawite allies in Syria, who share Tehran's interest in pressuring Israel. The organization was particularly useful in the days of the civil war when Lebanon was overrun with warring militias and crawling with U.S., Israeli and French security forces along with Palestinian Liberation Organization fighters. However, the assassination in 2005 of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri considerably altered the political landscape in Lebanon. A number of resulting complications have affected Hezbollah's ability -- and willingness -- to serve as an effective Iranian satellite.
Iran is apparently displeased with Hezbollah leader Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah's failure to demonstrate complete loyalty to the regime. Complaints are circulating in Iran's regime that Nasrallah receives more directives from Damascus than from Tehran. Nasrallah might be acting under increased pressure to demonstrate that Hezbollah is an Arab-Lebanese entity, but whatever the reason for his behavior, Iran allegedly is now aiming to replace Nasrallah and merge the pro-Syrian Shiite Amal movement with a revamped Hezbollah. Unconfirmed reports indicate that Iran is grooming Hezbollah's Hashim Safieddine to replace Nasrallah -- a move that could erupt into a major rift within the organization.
Iran's concerns over Nasrallah coincide with its diminishing confidence in Syrian President Bashar al Assad, whose regime has been humiliated relentlessly by the ongoing U.N. investigation into the al-Hariri killing and former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam's public display of defection. With Syria wrapped up in its own political tangle, Iran is setting out to secure a strong Shiite Lebanese bloc for itself -- beginning with its plan to consolidate support within Hezbollah.
Hezbollah has struggled to redefine itself as a Lebanese nationalist movement since the al-Hariri assassination. The group wants to avoid the touchy issue of disarmament and maintain its legitimacy as a resistance movement against Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon's Shebaa Farms, rather than be branded a "militia" and forced to disarm. To this end, Hezbollah has been using its political capital to negotiate with Saad al-Hariri -- Lebanon's leading Sunni political figure and son of the former prime minister -- to alter the government's stance toward fully implementing U.N. Resolution 1559, which calls for the disarmament of all Lebanese militias. Hezbollah and the Amal movement recently prompted a major Cabinet crisis and returned Lebanon to its usual political chaos when the government's Shiite ministers decided to boycott the Cabinet and gridlock the political system until the organization's demands are met. The Shiite ministers have refused to resign, and the prime minister cannot dismiss them -- which gives the Shiite bloc an effective bargaining tool to diminish international attempts to intervene in Lebanon, pressure the Syrian regime and force Hezbollah to disarm.
Adding to Hezbollah's difficulties is the growing presence of al Qaeda-linked militants attempting to set up a jihadist base in Lebanon. Lebanese security forces arrested 13 suspected al Qaeda members Jan. 13 and charged them with plotting terrorist attacks, forging documents and possessing weapons. It comes as no surprise that al Qaeda is attempting to build a presence in Lebanon. On Jan. 10, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al Qaeda in Iraq said in an Internet statement that it has waged "a new attack" against Israel by launching 10 Katyusha rockets from Lebanon into northern Israel "at the instructions of Osama bin Laden." As al Qaeda's Iraq node is threatened, the group faces more pressure to team up with dissident Palestinian militants in order to target Israel, penetrate al-Zarqawi's hometown in Jordan and develop an al Qaeda cell in Lebanon. Fledgling cells have already taken root in certain Palestinian refugee camps, such as Ain al-Hilweh in southern Lebanon.
Al Qaeda's major obstacle to setting up shop in Lebanon's mostly Shiite south is none other than Hezbollah, which views al Qaeda militants as encroaching on its territory. Hezbollah has serious ideological differences with al Qaeda and especially with al-Zarqawi, whose fighters have killed thousands of Shia in Iraq and reportedly have threatened to kill senior Shia Lebanese political and religious leaders. Al Qaeda's entry into the picture also complicates Hezbollah's relatively quiet resistance against Israel and its efforts to bolster its legitimacy as a political and military force working in Lebanon's interests.
Hezbollah's nature has changed significantly since the Lebanese civil war. Since then, the militant group has grown less useful to Iran as a counter to Israeli moves against Tehran. Though Iran highly values Hezbollah's physical threat to Israel, Tehran's big question as it charges forward with its nuclear campaign is whether Tel Aviv will consider Hezbollah a serious factor when it comes time for Israel to decide between rocket attacks from Lebanon and the larger threat of a nuclear-armed Iran.
Posted by Ted Belman at January 17, 2006 06:23 PM