Iran's Redefined Strategy
Iran's Redefined Strategy
By George Friedman, STRATFOR
The Iranians have broken the International Atomic Energy Agency seals on some of their nuclear facilities. They did this very deliberately and publicly to make certain that everyone knew that Tehran was proceeding with its nuclear program. Prior to this, and in parallel, the Iranians began to -- among other things -- systematically bait the Israelis, threatening to wipe them from the face of the earth.
The question, of course, is what exactly the Iranians are up to. They do not yet have nuclear weapons. The Israelis do. The Iranians have now hinted that (a) they plan to build nuclear weapons and have implied, as clearly as possible without saying it, that (b) they plan to use them against Israel. On the surface, these statements appear to be begging for a pre-emptive strike by Israel. There are many things one might hope for, but a surprise visit from the Israeli air force is not usually one of them. Nevertheless, that is exactly what the Iranians seem to be doing, so we need to sort this out.
There are four possibilities:
1. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, is insane and wants to be attacked because of a bad childhood.
2. The Iranians are engaged in a complex diplomatic maneuver, and this is part of it.
3. The Iranians think they can get nuclear weapons -- and a deterrent to Israel -- before the Israelis attack.
4. The Iranians, actually and rationally, would welcome an Israeli -- or for that matter, American -- air strike.
Let's begin with the insanity issue, just to get it out of the way. One of the ways to avoid thinking seriously about foreign policy is to dismiss as a nutcase anyone who does not behave as you yourself would. As such, he is unpredictable and, while scary, cannot be controlled. You are therefore relieved of the burden of doing anything about him. In foreign policy, it is sometimes useful to appear to be insane, as it is in poker: The less predictable you are, the more power you have -- and insanity is a great tool of unpredictability. Some leaders cultivate an aura of insanity.
However, people who climb to the leadership of nations containing many millions of people must be highly disciplined, with insight into others and the ability to plan carefully. Lunatics rarely have those characteristics. Certainly, there have been sociopaths -- like Hitler -- but at the same time, he was a very able, insightful, meticulous man. He might have been crazy, but dismissing him because he was crazy -- as many did -- was a massive mistake. Moreover, leaders do not rise alone. They are surrounded by other ambitious people. In the case of Ahmadinejad, he is answerable to others above him (in this case, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei), alongside him and below him. He did not get to where he is by being nuts -- and even if we think what he says is insane, it clearly doesn't strike the rest of his audience as insane. Thinking of him as insane is neither helpful nor clarifying.
The Three-Player Game
So what is happening?
First, the Iranians obviously are responding to the Americans. Tehran's position in Iraq is not what the Iranians had hoped it would be. U.S. maneuvers with the Sunnis in Iraq and the behavior of Iraqi Shiite leaders clearly have created a situation in which the outcome will not be the creation of an Iranian satellite state. At best, Iraq will be influenced by Iran or neutral. At worst, it will drift back into opposition to Iran -- which has been Iraq's traditional geopolitical position. This is not satisfactory. Iran's Iraq policy has not failed, but it is not the outcome Tehran dreamt of in 2003.
There is a much larger issue. The United States has managed its position in Iraq -- to the extent that it has been managed -- by manipulating the Sunni-Shiite fault line in the Muslim world. In the same way that Richard Nixon manipulated the Sino-Soviet split, the fundamental fault line in the Communist world, to keep the Soviets contained and off-balance late in the Vietnam War, so the Bush administration has used the primordial fault line in the Islamic world, the Sunni-Shiite split, to manipulate the situation in Iraq.
Washington did this on a broader scale as well. Having enticed Iran with new opportunities -- both for Iran as a nation and as the leading Shiite power in a post-Saddam world -- the administration turned to Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia and enticed them into accommodation with the United States by allowing them to consider the consequences of an ascended Iran under canopy of a relationship with the United States. Washington used that vision of Iran to gain leverage in Saudi Arabia. The United States has been moving back and forth between Sunnis and Shia since the invasion of Afghanistan, when it obtained Iranian support for operations in Afghanistan's Shiite regions. Each side was using the other. The United States, however, attained the strategic goal of any three-player game: It became the swing player between Sunnis and Shia.
This was not what the Iranians had hoped for.
Reclaiming the Banner
There is yet another dimension to this. In 1979, when the Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini deposed the Shah of Iran, Iran was the center of revolutionary Islamism. It both stood against the United States and positioned itself as the standard-bearer for radical Islamist youth. It was Iran, through its creation, Hezbollah, that pioneered suicide bombings. It championed the principle of revolutionary Islamism against both collaborationist states like Saudi Arabia and secular revolutionaries like Yasser Arafat. It positioned Shi'ism as the protector of the faith and the hope of the future.
In having to defend against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the 1980s, and the resulting containment battle, Iran became ensnared in a range of necessary but compromising relationships. Recall, if you will, that the Iran-Contra affair revealed not only that the United States used Israel to send weapons to Iran, but also that Iran accepted weapons from Israel. Iran did what it had to in order to survive, but the complexity of its operations led to serious compromises. By the late 1990s, Iran had lost any pretense of revolutionary primacy in the Islamic world. It had been flanked by the Sunni Wahhabi movement, al Qaeda.
The Iranians always saw al Qaeda as an outgrowth of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and therefore, through Shiite and Iranian eyes, never trusted it. Iran certainly didn't want al Qaeda to usurp the position of primary challenger to the West. Under any circumstances, it did not want al Qaeda to flourish. It was caught in a challenge. First, it had to reduce al Qaeda's influence, or concede that the Sunnis had taken the banner from Khomeini's revolution. Second, Iran had to reclaim its place. Third, it had to do this without undermining its geopolitical interests.
Tehran spent the time from 2003 through 2005 maximizing what it could from the Iraq situation. It also quietly participated in the reduction of al Qaeda's network and global reach. In doing so, it appeared to much of the Islamic world as clever and capable, but not particularly principled. Tehran's clear willingness to collaborate on some level with the United States in Afghanistan, in Iraq and in the war on al Qaeda made it appear as collaborationist as it had accused the Kuwaitis or Saudis of being in the past. By the end of 2005, Iran had secured its western frontier as well as it could, had achieved what influence it could in Baghdad, had seen al Qaeda weakened. It was time for the next phase. It had to reclaim its position as the leader of the Islamic revolutionary movement for itself and for Shi'ism.
Thus, the selection of the new president was, in retrospect, carefully engineered. After President Mohammed Khatami's term, all moderates were excluded from the electoral process by decree, and the election came down to a struggle between former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani -- an heir to Khomeini's tradition, but also an heir to the tactical pragmatism of the 1980s and 1990s -- and Ahmadinejad, the clearest descendent of the Khomeini revolution that there was in Iran, and someone who in many ways had avoided the worst taints of compromise.
Ahmadinejad was set loose to reclaim Iran's position in the Muslim world. Since Iran had collaborated with Israel during the 1980s, and since Iranian money in Lebanon had mingled with Israeli money, the first thing he had to do was to reassert Iran's anti-Zionist credentials. He did that by threatening Israel's existence and denying the Holocaust. Whether he believed what he was saying is immaterial. Ahmadinejad used the Holocaust issue to do two things: First, he established himself as intellectually both anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish, taking the far flank among Islamic leaders; and second, he signaled a massive breach with Khatami's approach.
Khatami was focused on splitting the Western world by dividing the Americans from the Europeans. In carrying out this policy, he had to manipulate the Europeans. The Europeans were always open to the claim that the Americans were being rigid and were delighted to serve the role of sophisticated mediator. Khatami used the Europeans' vanity brilliantly, sucking them into endless discussions and turning the Iran situation into a problem the Europeans were having with the United States.
But Tehran paid a price for this in the Muslim world. In drawing close to the Europeans, the Iranians simply appeared to be up to their old game of unprincipled realpolitik with people -- Europeans -- who were no better than the Americans. The Europeans were simply Americans who were weaker. Ahmadinejad could not carry out his strategy of flanking the Wahhabis and still continue the minuet with Europe. So he ended Khatami's game with a bang, with a massive diatribe on the Holocaust and by arguing that if there had been one, the Europeans bore the blame. That froze Germany out of any further dealings with Tehran, and even the French had to back off. Iran's stock in the Islamic world started to rise.
The Nuclear Gambit
The second phase was for Iran to very publicly resume -- or very publicly claim to be resuming -- development of a nuclear weapon. This signaled three things:
1. Iran's policy of accommodation with the West was over.
2. Iran intended to get a nuclear weapon in order to become the only real challenge to Israel and, not incidentally, a regional power that Sunni states would have to deal with.
3. Iran was prepared to take risks that no other Muslim actor was prepared to take. Al Qaeda was a piker.
The fundamental fact is that Ahmadinejad knows that, except in the case of extreme luck, Iran will not be able to get nuclear weapons. First, building a nuclear device is not the same thing as building a nuclear weapon. A nuclear weapon must be sufficiently small, robust and reliable to deliver to a target. A nuclear device has to sit there and go boom. The key technologies here are not the ones that build a device but the ones that turn a device into a weapon -- and then there is the delivery system to worry about: range, reliability, payload, accuracy. Iran has a way to go.
A lot of countries don't want an Iranian bomb. Israel is one. The United States is another. Throw Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and most of the 'Stans into this, and there are not a lot of supporters for an Iranian bomb. However, there are only two countries that can do something about it. The Israelis don't want to get the grief, but they are the ones who cannot avoid action because they are the most vulnerable if Iran should develop a weapon. The United States doesn't want Israel to strike at Iran, as that would massively complicate the U.S. situation in the region, but it doesn't want to carry out the strike itself either.
This, by the way, is a good place to pause and explain to readers who will write in wondering why the United States will tolerate an Israeli nuclear force but not an Iranian one. The answer is simple. Israel will probably not blow up New York. That's why the United States doesn't mind Israel having nukes and does mind Iran having them. Is that fair? This is power politics, not sharing time in preschool. End of digression.
Intra-Islamic Diplomacy
If the Iranians are seen as getting too close to a weapon, either the United States or Israel will take them out, and there is an outside chance that the facilities could not be taken out with a high degree of assurance unless nukes are used. In the past, our view was that the Iranians would move carefully in using the nukes to gain leverage against the United States. That is no longer clear. Their focus now seems to be not on their traditional diplomacy, but on a more radical, intra-Islamic diplomacy. That means that they might welcome a (survivable) attack by Israel or the United States. It would burnish Iran's credentials as the true martyr and fighter of Islam.
Meanwhile, the Iranians appear to be reaching out to the Sunnis on a number of levels. Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of a radical Shiite group in Iraq with ties to Iran, visited Saudi Arabia recently. There are contacts between radical Shia and Sunnis in Lebanon as well. The Iranians appear to be engaged in an attempt to create the kind of coalition in the Muslim world that al Qaeda failed to create. From Tehran's point of view, if they get a deliverable nuclear device, that's great -- but if they are attacked by Israel or the United States, that's not a bad outcome either.
In short, the diplomacy that Iran practiced from the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war until after the U.S. invasion of Iraq appears to be ended. Iran is making a play for ownership of revolutionary Islamism on behalf of itself and the Shia. Thus, Tehran will continue to make provocative moves, while hoping to avoid counterstrikes. On the other hand, if there are counterstrikes, the Iranians will probably be able to live with that as well.
Posted by Ted Belman at January 18, 2006 06:13 AM
Trackback Pings
TrackBack URL for this entry:
http://www.israpundit.com/mt-tb.cgi/12106
1.
Ted Belman
said:
Arab countries have always sought a leadership position in the Arab world by burnishing their anti-Israel credentials. So it is not surprising that Iran is looking for a leadership role by attacking Israel verbally and challenging them as Nasser, Hussein and Assad all did.
I have long argued that the US should be supporting the Sunnis as a counter measure to Iranian influence in Iraq.
I am not convinced as Friedman is that the US has succeeded in nutralizing Iran. I have argued that "Iran had the US by the balls". I hope Friedman is right.
I am glad to read his opinion that Iran will not succeed in getting the Bomb.
I continue to focus on the Shiite Sunni divide.
Posted by: Ted Belman on January 17, 2006 11:37 PM
2.
BobW
said:
George Friedman's long article omitted any reference to the world's largest contract. It's between Iran and PR China. It's subject matter is oil.
Appreciated Friedman's hint that Shanghai I (Feb '72) really ended the Vietnam War and not the Paris Peace Accord in 1973.
Kol tuv,
BobW
Posted by: BobW on January 18, 2006 05:14 AM
3.
Jerusalem Posts
said:
Ayatollahs Want a Hizbollah Corridor From Iran to Israel
Ayatollahs Want a Hizbollah Corridor From Iran to Israel
That's why they need to take control of Iraq!
Al-Sadr made a significant statement today that received little coverage. He accused the US of "invading Iraq" because GWB "knew" that the "mahdi (muslim "savior") will arise in Iran." And he said that as Sunnis and Shiites united against US forces.
For more about the Mahdi, see: http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=37782
I have posted similar articles before, but this time it might penetrate the wall of naive preconceptions about the nominal Arab/Persian appetite for democracy, liberty and peace with America, etc:
THE KHURASAN PROPHECY
"The narrations of the Prophet (Sallallaahu `alayhi wa sallam) prophesy of a Muslim force from the East ("al-Mashriq"), possibly from the land of "Khorasan" (Ahmad, Tirmithi, etc, Hasan/Da`eef, ikhtilaaf) which is today Afghanistan, that will march towards the West conquering everything in site and will remain undefeated until they reach Jerusalem (termed "Eeliyaa'" in the Hadeeth). They and their Amir will give bayah to the MAHDI. However, in the path of this force from the East lies a powerful behemoth called Iran from where the Prophet (Sallallaahu `alayhi wa sallam) said Dajjal will appear with a following of 70,000 Jews in Isfahaan (Abu Bakr, raDee Allaahu `anhu, said this would be in the direction of Khorasan in the city of Isfahan). Thus we can assume there will be a major war between the forces of the Sunnah in the East and the Iranians and their "70,000 Jews" (Sahih Muslim) who lie in the path of Jerusalem. While there remains difference of opinion regarding the authenticity of some of these narrations, they seem to be taking shape in spite of the ikhtilaaf."
---------------------------------------- ------------------------
"bayah" - "blood oath" (Osama bin Laden required his koranimals to make such an oath to him)
"Dajjal" - "anti-Christ"
I downloaded the above from a website (www.khurasaan.com) that Homeland Security shut down, alleging - credibly - that these pro al-Qaeda elements were signalling followers by coding instructions in their daily news banner.
KHURASAAN encompasses parts of Iran, Afghanistan, and ex-Soviet republics. It was also the birthplace of Bukhari, whose recorded hearsay statements ("hadith") of the ersatz "prophet" Mohammed, are held sacred to muslims.
In November 2001, MULLAH OMAR, the Taliban terrorist leader told a BBC reporter that "America will be destroyed." Three years earlier he deflected a 150,000 man Iranian army which had massed on Afghanistan's borders, to inflict revenge against the Taliban for murdering 10 Iranian diplomats. Why the bragadoccio about America and volte face towards Iran? Notwithstanding their differences, Iranian Shiites and Iraqi Sunnis share belief in the KHORASAN PROPHECY. An al-Qaeda cleric - Sheik al-Hawali (rehabilitated by the Saud entity in 1999, after 5 years of incarceration for attending Teheran's annual jihad conference) has been predicting America's "destruction" for years. In fact, he dates it as before the "destruction of Israel" which he dates to the year "2012."
http://www.islamicawakening.com/viewarticle.php?articleID=908
Big deal? Well, segments of HAMAS, Hizbollah, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Hizb-Mahdi (al-Sadr terrorists) all operate under "black flags" and, increasingly in black uniforms. Of course, muslim sectarians kill each other. But they also unite, as in the case of Haj (pilgrimage) privilege, because the ersatz-"prophet" predicted both sectarianism and sectarian unity within conflict. They are uniting in conflict with America and Israel. This is mortal combat, and will not end until, Western Civilization destroys islam as an ideology. And that may well require massive use of nuclear weapons, possibly resulting in the deaths of at least 50,000,000 muslims. However, when a significant majority of civilized peoples come to understand the global-genocidal juggernaut of islam, then they will understand that infliction of mega-death was a forced choice.
If you believe that the Sunni-Shiite terror against American liberators will burn out, it won't. In Bush's attempt to export an unwanted commodity - democracy and liberty - to enemy barbarians, he is left with a best-case scenario in which 90% of Mideast oil comes under the direct control of Iran's Ayatoilets. Where's the security?
Posted by: Jerusalem Posts on January 18, 2006 08:22 AM
4.
georg von mecklenburg
said:
We are daling with a very large exporter of oil. Nothing would delight the Bush administration better than to have this oil removed from the marketplace. Talk about bread lins, think again about long lines to purchase fuel in the free world.
Posted by: georg von mecklenburg on January 18, 2006 08:28 AM
5.
Jerusalem Posts
said:
georg von mecklenburg, I think you're wrong, and here's the reason:
"It was what made this E.U. Three approach so successful. They [Britain, France and Germany] stood together and they had one uniform position."
-- German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, Jan. 13
by Charles Krauthammer
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/17/AR2006011700893.html
Makes you want to weep. One day earlier, Britain, France and Germany admitted that their two years of talks to stop Iran's nuclear weapons program had collapsed. The Iranians had broken the seals on their nuclear facilities and were resuming activity in defiance of their pledges to the "E.U. Three." This negotiating exercise, designed as an alternative to the U.S. approach of imposing sanctions on Iran for its violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, had proved entirely futile. If anything, the two-year hiatus gave Iran time to harden its nuclear facilities against bombardment, acquire new antiaircraft capacities and clandestinely advance its program.
With all this, the chancellor of Germany declared the exercise a success because the allies stuck together! The last such success was Dunkirk. Lots of solidarity there, too.
Most dismaying was that this assessment came from a genuinely good friend, the new German chancellor, who, unlike her predecessor, Gerhard Schroeder (now a wholly owned Putin flunky working for Russia's state-run oil monopoly), actually wants to do something about terrorism and nuclear proliferation.
Ah, success. Instead of being years away from the point of no return for an Iranian bomb, as we were before we allowed Europe to divert anti-proliferation efforts into transparently useless talks, Iran is probably just months away. And now, of course, Iran is run by an even more radical government, led by a president who fervently believes in the imminence of the apocalypse.
Ah, success. Having delayed two years, we now have to deal with a set of fanatical Islamists who we know will not be deterred from pursuing nuclear weapons by any sanctions. Even if we could get real sanctions. Which we will not. The remaining months before Iran goes nuclear are about to be frittered away in pursuit of this newest placebo.
First, because Russia and China will threaten to veto any serious sanctions. The Chinese in particular have secured in Iran a source of oil and gas outside the American sphere to feed their growing economy and are quite happy geopolitically to support a rogue power that -- like North Korea -- threatens, distracts and diminishes the power of China's chief global rival, the United States.
Second, because the Europeans have no appetite for real sanctions either. A travel ban on Iranian leaders would be a joke; they don't travel anyway. A cutoff of investment and high-tech trade from Europe would be a minor irritant to a country of 70 million people with the second-largest oil reserves in the world and with oil at $60 a barrel. North Korea tolerated 2 million dead from starvation to get its nuclear weapons. Iran will tolerate a shortage of flat-screen TVs.
The only sanctions that might conceivably have any effect would be a boycott of Iranian oil. No one is even talking about that, because no one can bear the thought of the oil shock that would follow, taking 4.2 million barrels a day off the market, from a total output of about 84 million barrels.
The threat works in reverse. It is the Iranians who have the world over a barrel. On Jan. 15, Iran's economy minister warned that Iran would retaliate for any sanctions by cutting its exports to "raise oil prices beyond levels the West expects." A full cutoff could bring $100 oil and plunge the world into economic crisis.
Which is one of the reasons the Europeans are so mortified by the very thought of a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. The problem is not just that they are spread out and hardened, making them difficult to find and to damage sufficiently to seriously set back Iran's program.
The problem that mortifies the Europeans is what Iran might do after such an attack -- not just cut off its oil exports but shut down the Strait of Hormuz by firing missiles at tankers or scuttling its vessels to make the strait impassable. It would require an international armada led by the United States to break such a blockade.
Such consequences -- serious economic disruption and possible naval action -- are something a cocooned, aging, post-historic Europe cannot even contemplate. Which is why the Europeans have had their heads in the sand for two years. And why they will spend the little time remaining -- before a group of apocalyptic madmen go nuclear -- putting their heads back in the sand. And congratulating themselves on allied solidarity as they do so in unison.
Posted by: Jerusalem Posts on January 18, 2006 09:01 AM
6.
George
said:
The best way to disarm Iran is to push for complete nuclear disarmament in the Middle East -- including Israel. The current nuclear standoff would not be occurring had Israel not embarked on its own nuclear programme decades back. Israel should sign the NPT and disarm completely.
Posted by: George on January 18, 2006 09:05 AM
7.
Jerusalem Posts
said:
George, why blame Israel?
Iran has signed the non-proliferation treaty and Israel hasn't - and the biggest danger to the world right now is Iran, unless of course, you're an Islamist or Arabist who supports terrorism, in which case you'd think that Israel was the danger!
Posted by: Jerusalem Posts on January 18, 2006 09:14 AM
8.
Jerusalem Posts
said:
Anyway George, didn't the previous article get you thinking of how wrong you are to want to get oil pushed up to over $100 a barrel? Or would you rather use a bicycle and walk everywhere?
Posted by: Jerusalem Posts on January 18, 2006 09:15 AM
9.
Ted Belman
said:
Don't think for a moment that Iran just wants the Bomb because Israel has it. Israel is not a threat to Iran or to Arabs. Linking Israel to the debate is just to shift focus and attack Israel.
Iran wants the Bomb so it can dominate the ME.
Posted by: Ted Belman on January 18, 2006 09:49 AM
10.
Ptah
said:
The fundamental fact is that Ahmadinejad knows that, except in the case of extreme luck, Iran will not be able to get nuclear weapons.
I call bullshit: this is a bare assertion, made by the author outside of his field of expertise, in the hope that the perceived expertise that he tries to demonstrate in his article up to this time is unwittingly imputed to him. He has NO IDEA what Ahmadinejad is really thinking. He has no idea what the REAL state of the Iranian nuclear program is.
This, by the way, is a good place to pause and explain to readers who will write in wondering why the United States will tolerate an Israeli nuclear force but not an Iranian one. The answer is simple. Israel will probably not blow up New York. That's why the United States doesn't mind Israel having nukes and does mind Iran having them. Is that fair? This is power politics, not sharing time in preschool. End of digression.
Actually, the massive amount of restraint Israel shows to the palestinians, and the excessive regard that they show to world opinion and United States pressure, is a terrific indicator of how responsible Israel is as a nuclear power. "He who is faithful in little is faithful in much", so if Israel shows incredible restraint with regard to murderous palestinians next door, they're probably the LAST people we would expect on the planet to USE nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is only Arab BELIEF in their own anti-semitic propaganda that makes them fear Israel's "Samson Option". I myself wonder if the GOI DOES have the cojones to follow through.
The distinction between "device" and "weapon" is facetious: the middle east is awash in AWACS planes, some of which are owned by the Saudis, so why should Iran use a means of delivery that is undeniable, when a moderately sized device, constructed according to the detailed Nork/Chinese plans already out there, can be packed in a container, put on a ship, shuffled in the system while on a long journey through the malacca straight, and deniably detonated in the Harbor of London, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, or New York City? Its not as if they won't get the credit: The generally accepted practice of Taqyyia allows for Iran to publicly deny they did it, while circulating through their back channels that they were responsible. If Ahmadinejad is aware of anything, it is because liberals and Euros, hating the US, will provide PLENTY of cover to prevent US retaliatory action against Iran.
A fizzle isn't a problem: the day of reckoning is just postponed, not prevented, and the discovery of a fizzled weapon would lead nowhere: In the current political climate, would the Bush administration ADMIT IN PUBLIC that an attempt to trigger a foreign nuclear device on american soil was foiled, not because of the cleverness of the FBI or the competence of local law enforcement, but because the creators were amateurs?
There are more goddamned holes in his argument than in a hoop of swiss cheese. Putz and idiot, unless his intent is, like the EU, to cause the US problems by introducing more delay, delay, delay.
Posted by: Ptah on January 18, 2006 10:07 AM
11.
Dan Barkye
said:
The article is brilliant, superb and coherent. I find it most compelling, more than F. Gill-White's "US hidden goals" in understanding the game in the region, played by the players involved.
The only thing I am opposed to is George's assertion (post # 6) that Isr should denuclearize b/c this is the real problem, and doing so will defuse the issue of nuclear arms in the ME.
This argument stands in the same category of arguments as the one that says that if Isr concedes in any way, there will be peace w them.
As no concession of any kind will bring peace w them while Isr is still there, so no denuclearization of Isr will bring a non-nuclear/bio/chem ME.
Next thing he'll say, is that Pakistan will denuke b/c Isr is no longer a threat, but Pak has India at its throat, and Iran will have the region and the world at its feet, having the bomb, Isr or no Isr.
All the more, b/c Iran knows that it won't be allowed the bomb, it plays the game to extort any political gain possible: You don't have to have it, all you have to do, is make them *believe* that you have it. Clever, very clever!
While eventually they won't have it, The EU will shut up, the world kneels at its feet b/c of the oil, the region will submit to them, and Isr will be deprived of her only real defense means. In the meantime, they save money by not bringing the project to its finish line, something that requires much money, very much, and much efforts and expertise that they don't have, ultimately, but this is a secondary issue, really.
If, OTOH, it acquires the bomb in spite of all the threats and pressure, then all the more, it will acquire a real credibility to its threats addressed to all parties involved, the EU, the US, Isr and the region.
It appears that Isr is the only one that believes in the latter possibility.
US may look/sound to do the same, but I am inclined to think like George, that it plays the "Divide and Rule" game, playing the Sunnis vs the Shiites w much success.
For Iran, the game it plays, presents a win-win situation, no matter how it turns out.
Posted by: Dan Barkye on January 18, 2006 08:16 PM
12.
George
said:
Firstly, I am not an Islamist or ar Arab, or anything else that would cause me to be biased in favour of ; or againse Israel or Iran. My concern with Israel having nukes is :
1) It encourages other countries in this already volatile region to seek nuclear weapons. Pakistan did not have nuclear ambitions until India obtained them -- nuclear weapons are contagious because if your enemy has them then your only choice is to obtain them as well.
2) Israel's politics are becoming increasing unstable and hard-line. This is largely because of the growth of the religious right in Israel, which due to demographic trends, may actually come to power in the forseeable future. Many of these parties openly advocate war with Israel's neighbors, which would be a serious problem if that war happened to be nuclear. Should the west really trust the National Religious Party with a nuclear arsenal? I dont trust religious zealots of any kind with nukes -- certainly not the Islamic ones. Call me over-cautious for not wanting me kids to glow in the dark, but I think that Israel should be happy having one of the strongest conventional forces in the world.
Posted by: George on January 20, 2006 11:34 PM
Post a comment
|
Iran's Redefined Strategy
By George Friedman, STRATFOR
The Iranians have broken the International Atomic Energy Agency seals on some of their nuclear facilities. They did this very deliberately and publicly to make certain that everyone knew that Tehran was proceeding with its nuclear program. Prior to this, and in parallel, the Iranians began to -- among other things -- systematically bait the Israelis, threatening to wipe them from the face of the earth.
The question, of course, is what exactly the Iranians are up to. They do not yet have nuclear weapons. The Israelis do. The Iranians have now hinted that (a) they plan to build nuclear weapons and have implied, as clearly as possible without saying it, that (b) they plan to use them against Israel. On the surface, these statements appear to be begging for a pre-emptive strike by Israel. There are many things one might hope for, but a surprise visit from the Israeli air force is not usually one of them. Nevertheless, that is exactly what the Iranians seem to be doing, so we need to sort this out.
There are four possibilities:
1. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, is insane and wants to be attacked because of a bad childhood.
2. The Iranians are engaged in a complex diplomatic maneuver, and this is part of it.
3. The Iranians think they can get nuclear weapons -- and a deterrent to Israel -- before the Israelis attack.
4. The Iranians, actually and rationally, would welcome an Israeli -- or for that matter, American -- air strike.
Let's begin with the insanity issue, just to get it out of the way. One of the ways to avoid thinking seriously about foreign policy is to dismiss as a nutcase anyone who does not behave as you yourself would. As such, he is unpredictable and, while scary, cannot be controlled. You are therefore relieved of the burden of doing anything about him. In foreign policy, it is sometimes useful to appear to be insane, as it is in poker: The less predictable you are, the more power you have -- and insanity is a great tool of unpredictability. Some leaders cultivate an aura of insanity.
However, people who climb to the leadership of nations containing many millions of people must be highly disciplined, with insight into others and the ability to plan carefully. Lunatics rarely have those characteristics. Certainly, there have been sociopaths -- like Hitler -- but at the same time, he was a very able, insightful, meticulous man. He might have been crazy, but dismissing him because he was crazy -- as many did -- was a massive mistake. Moreover, leaders do not rise alone. They are surrounded by other ambitious people. In the case of Ahmadinejad, he is answerable to others above him (in this case, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei), alongside him and below him. He did not get to where he is by being nuts -- and even if we think what he says is insane, it clearly doesn't strike the rest of his audience as insane. Thinking of him as insane is neither helpful nor clarifying.
The Three-Player Game
So what is happening?
First, the Iranians obviously are responding to the Americans. Tehran's position in Iraq is not what the Iranians had hoped it would be. U.S. maneuvers with the Sunnis in Iraq and the behavior of Iraqi Shiite leaders clearly have created a situation in which the outcome will not be the creation of an Iranian satellite state. At best, Iraq will be influenced by Iran or neutral. At worst, it will drift back into opposition to Iran -- which has been Iraq's traditional geopolitical position. This is not satisfactory. Iran's Iraq policy has not failed, but it is not the outcome Tehran dreamt of in 2003.
There is a much larger issue. The United States has managed its position in Iraq -- to the extent that it has been managed -- by manipulating the Sunni-Shiite fault line in the Muslim world. In the same way that Richard Nixon manipulated the Sino-Soviet split, the fundamental fault line in the Communist world, to keep the Soviets contained and off-balance late in the Vietnam War, so the Bush administration has used the primordial fault line in the Islamic world, the Sunni-Shiite split, to manipulate the situation in Iraq.
Washington did this on a broader scale as well. Having enticed Iran with new opportunities -- both for Iran as a nation and as the leading Shiite power in a post-Saddam world -- the administration turned to Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia and enticed them into accommodation with the United States by allowing them to consider the consequences of an ascended Iran under canopy of a relationship with the United States. Washington used that vision of Iran to gain leverage in Saudi Arabia. The United States has been moving back and forth between Sunnis and Shia since the invasion of Afghanistan, when it obtained Iranian support for operations in Afghanistan's Shiite regions. Each side was using the other. The United States, however, attained the strategic goal of any three-player game: It became the swing player between Sunnis and Shia.
This was not what the Iranians had hoped for.
Reclaiming the Banner
There is yet another dimension to this. In 1979, when the Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini deposed the Shah of Iran, Iran was the center of revolutionary Islamism. It both stood against the United States and positioned itself as the standard-bearer for radical Islamist youth. It was Iran, through its creation, Hezbollah, that pioneered suicide bombings. It championed the principle of revolutionary Islamism against both collaborationist states like Saudi Arabia and secular revolutionaries like Yasser Arafat. It positioned Shi'ism as the protector of the faith and the hope of the future.
In having to defend against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the 1980s, and the resulting containment battle, Iran became ensnared in a range of necessary but compromising relationships. Recall, if you will, that the Iran-Contra affair revealed not only that the United States used Israel to send weapons to Iran, but also that Iran accepted weapons from Israel. Iran did what it had to in order to survive, but the complexity of its operations led to serious compromises. By the late 1990s, Iran had lost any pretense of revolutionary primacy in the Islamic world. It had been flanked by the Sunni Wahhabi movement, al Qaeda.
The Iranians always saw al Qaeda as an outgrowth of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and therefore, through Shiite and Iranian eyes, never trusted it. Iran certainly didn't want al Qaeda to usurp the position of primary challenger to the West. Under any circumstances, it did not want al Qaeda to flourish. It was caught in a challenge. First, it had to reduce al Qaeda's influence, or concede that the Sunnis had taken the banner from Khomeini's revolution. Second, Iran had to reclaim its place. Third, it had to do this without undermining its geopolitical interests.
Tehran spent the time from 2003 through 2005 maximizing what it could from the Iraq situation. It also quietly participated in the reduction of al Qaeda's network and global reach. In doing so, it appeared to much of the Islamic world as clever and capable, but not particularly principled. Tehran's clear willingness to collaborate on some level with the United States in Afghanistan, in Iraq and in the war on al Qaeda made it appear as collaborationist as it had accused the Kuwaitis or Saudis of being in the past. By the end of 2005, Iran had secured its western frontier as well as it could, had achieved what influence it could in Baghdad, had seen al Qaeda weakened. It was time for the next phase. It had to reclaim its position as the leader of the Islamic revolutionary movement for itself and for Shi'ism.
Thus, the selection of the new president was, in retrospect, carefully engineered. After President Mohammed Khatami's term, all moderates were excluded from the electoral process by decree, and the election came down to a struggle between former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani -- an heir to Khomeini's tradition, but also an heir to the tactical pragmatism of the 1980s and 1990s -- and Ahmadinejad, the clearest descendent of the Khomeini revolution that there was in Iran, and someone who in many ways had avoided the worst taints of compromise.
Ahmadinejad was set loose to reclaim Iran's position in the Muslim world. Since Iran had collaborated with Israel during the 1980s, and since Iranian money in Lebanon had mingled with Israeli money, the first thing he had to do was to reassert Iran's anti-Zionist credentials. He did that by threatening Israel's existence and denying the Holocaust. Whether he believed what he was saying is immaterial. Ahmadinejad used the Holocaust issue to do two things: First, he established himself as intellectually both anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish, taking the far flank among Islamic leaders; and second, he signaled a massive breach with Khatami's approach.
Khatami was focused on splitting the Western world by dividing the Americans from the Europeans. In carrying out this policy, he had to manipulate the Europeans. The Europeans were always open to the claim that the Americans were being rigid and were delighted to serve the role of sophisticated mediator. Khatami used the Europeans' vanity brilliantly, sucking them into endless discussions and turning the Iran situation into a problem the Europeans were having with the United States.
But Tehran paid a price for this in the Muslim world. In drawing close to the Europeans, the Iranians simply appeared to be up to their old game of unprincipled realpolitik with people -- Europeans -- who were no better than the Americans. The Europeans were simply Americans who were weaker. Ahmadinejad could not carry out his strategy of flanking the Wahhabis and still continue the minuet with Europe. So he ended Khatami's game with a bang, with a massive diatribe on the Holocaust and by arguing that if there had been one, the Europeans bore the blame. That froze Germany out of any further dealings with Tehran, and even the French had to back off. Iran's stock in the Islamic world started to rise.
The Nuclear Gambit
The second phase was for Iran to very publicly resume -- or very publicly claim to be resuming -- development of a nuclear weapon. This signaled three things:
1. Iran's policy of accommodation with the West was over.
2. Iran intended to get a nuclear weapon in order to become the only real challenge to Israel and, not incidentally, a regional power that Sunni states would have to deal with.
3. Iran was prepared to take risks that no other Muslim actor was prepared to take. Al Qaeda was a piker.
The fundamental fact is that Ahmadinejad knows that, except in the case of extreme luck, Iran will not be able to get nuclear weapons. First, building a nuclear device is not the same thing as building a nuclear weapon. A nuclear weapon must be sufficiently small, robust and reliable to deliver to a target. A nuclear device has to sit there and go boom. The key technologies here are not the ones that build a device but the ones that turn a device into a weapon -- and then there is the delivery system to worry about: range, reliability, payload, accuracy. Iran has a way to go.
A lot of countries don't want an Iranian bomb. Israel is one. The United States is another. Throw Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and most of the 'Stans into this, and there are not a lot of supporters for an Iranian bomb. However, there are only two countries that can do something about it. The Israelis don't want to get the grief, but they are the ones who cannot avoid action because they are the most vulnerable if Iran should develop a weapon. The United States doesn't want Israel to strike at Iran, as that would massively complicate the U.S. situation in the region, but it doesn't want to carry out the strike itself either.
This, by the way, is a good place to pause and explain to readers who will write in wondering why the United States will tolerate an Israeli nuclear force but not an Iranian one. The answer is simple. Israel will probably not blow up New York. That's why the United States doesn't mind Israel having nukes and does mind Iran having them. Is that fair? This is power politics, not sharing time in preschool. End of digression.
Intra-Islamic Diplomacy
If the Iranians are seen as getting too close to a weapon, either the United States or Israel will take them out, and there is an outside chance that the facilities could not be taken out with a high degree of assurance unless nukes are used. In the past, our view was that the Iranians would move carefully in using the nukes to gain leverage against the United States. That is no longer clear. Their focus now seems to be not on their traditional diplomacy, but on a more radical, intra-Islamic diplomacy. That means that they might welcome a (survivable) attack by Israel or the United States. It would burnish Iran's credentials as the true martyr and fighter of Islam.
Meanwhile, the Iranians appear to be reaching out to the Sunnis on a number of levels. Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of a radical Shiite group in Iraq with ties to Iran, visited Saudi Arabia recently. There are contacts between radical Shia and Sunnis in Lebanon as well. The Iranians appear to be engaged in an attempt to create the kind of coalition in the Muslim world that al Qaeda failed to create. From Tehran's point of view, if they get a deliverable nuclear device, that's great -- but if they are attacked by Israel or the United States, that's not a bad outcome either.
In short, the diplomacy that Iran practiced from the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war until after the U.S. invasion of Iraq appears to be ended. Iran is making a play for ownership of revolutionary Islamism on behalf of itself and the Shia. Thus, Tehran will continue to make provocative moves, while hoping to avoid counterstrikes. On the other hand, if there are counterstrikes, the Iranians will probably be able to live with that as well.
Posted by Ted Belman at January 18, 2006 06:13 AM